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BRIDGEFUNDING: CROWDFUNDING AND THE
MARKET FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE
Seth C. Oranburg*
Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (Regu-
lation Crowdfunding) should encourage entrepreneurship by allowing
startups and small businesses to sell stock online.  Unfortunately, that
law applied Depression-era securities law concepts to peer-to-peer fi-
nancing in the Internet era; as a result, it implemented Internet-investor
protection ineffectively.  Using Regulation Crowdfunding requires star-
tups to comply with costly and unnecessary antifraud requirements.
Even after making disclosures, registering with a funding portal, and
producing audited financial statements, startups still cannot raise
enough money via Regulation Crowdfunding to deploy high-growth
strategies without needing more funds from professional angel and ven-
ture investors.
This Article explores the business environment of entrepreneurial
finance through the lens of securities regulations.  It finds that regulators
should be more concerned with protecting investors from startup failure
than from crowdfunding fraud.  It recommends an amendment to Regula-
tion Crowdfunding that may enable startup success: the limit on fun-
draising should be raised from $1 to $5 million.
Bridgefunding theory begins with the observation that historically
low percentages of startups are “bridging” from angel to venture financ-
ing; the rest often fail.  Legal and economic analyses demonstrate that
this growing gap is the result of regulations and market forces.
Bridgefunding recognizes that peer-to-peer Internet financing is inher-
ently different than securities issuances of yore.  It posits that crowdfund-
ing could bridge the funding gap and theorizes why bridgefunding may
be safer for investors and better for startups.
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INTRODUCTION
Wittlebee was a successful startup that failed for surprising reasons.
In 2011, former Myspace Vice President Sean Percival founded Wit-
tlebee, a children’s clothing club.1  Subscription business models in tech-
nology companies like Netflix and Amazon Prime were booming.2
Wittlebee extended that model to the retail clothing market in an exciting
new way.  Each month, busy parents would receive high-quality clothing
1 See Sean Percival, Introducing Wittlebee, http://seanpercival.com/2012/02/13/intro-
ducing-wittlebee/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (describing Wittlebee as “a new way to keep up
with your kids’ basic clothing needs.”).
2 See Dan Rayburn, Amazon’s Prime Streaming with Definitely Disrupt Netflix, BUSI-
NESS INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-prime-streaming-dis-
rupt-netflix-2011-2.
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for a low price.3  At first it seemed like a runaway success.  Initial inves-
tors contributed a shocking $2.5 million, five times what startups usually
raise.4  Wittlebee deployed the capital to grow quickly.  It developed a
user-friendly website, poached successful customer acquisition guru
Chris Nella from ShoeDazzle, and even purchased another startup called
Cottonseed Clothing.5 Revenues grew quickly—but not quickly enough.
Like most early stage startups, Wittlebee was not designed to be self
sufficient.  Startups focus on growth, not profitability, and are dependent
on raising outside funding to sustain that growth or even to continue
operations.  New money had usually been there for good startups like
Wittlebee.6  But in 2012, the money disappeared, and it has not returned.
One thousand startups were “orphaned” that year,7 including Wittlebee,
which eventually sold its business to FabKids for pennies on the dollar in
November 2013.8  Wittlebee’s business model succeeded when financed
by its new parent company.9  Its children’s clothing subscription model
was clearly a success, but its founders failed because the capital market
for startup investment has a gap, where money is in short supply.10
Other entrepreneurs, seeing that good startups like Wittlebee can be
forced to liquidate even when employing a successful business model,
may be discouraged from founding startups.
This Article is the first in legal literature to explore this gap as a
market failure and whether that failure is an unintended consequence of
certain legal regulations.  Many assume that capital markets are free mar-
3 Id. (explaining that Wittlebee is a new concept in the “subscription commerce” space).
4 See Wittlebee, CRUNCHBASE, http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/wittlebee
(last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
5 Michael Carney, Duck, Duck, Acquisition: Wittlebee Taps Kids Clothing Company
Cottonseed, PANDODAILY (Aug. 28, 2012), http://pando.com/2012/08/28/duck-duck-acqui-
sition-wittlebee-taps-childrens-clothing-company-cottonseed/.
6 In 2008, 225 companies received seed funding from angels and 118 of angel-funded
companies received additional financing from venture capital investors. PITCHBOOK, 2013
ANNUAL VENTURE CAPITAL RUNDOWN 9 (2013), http://files.pitchbook.com/pdf/PitchBook_VC
_Rundown_Y2013.pdf.  In 2012, angels funded 814 companies while venture capitalist in-
vested in only 244 of them. Id. Therefore the ratio of seed-funded to VC-funded companies
dropped from about 2:1 to about 4:1 in the period from 2008 to 2012.
7 Will Oremus, Tech Startups Are About to Start Dropping Like Flies, SLATE (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/12/20/series_a_crunch_tech_startups_
are_about_to_start_dropping_like_flies.html (“One thousand startups will be orphaned; many
will die.  One billion dollars will have gone for naught. Bright young minds across the country
will be out of work.”).
8 Michael Carney, Mother and Child Reunion: JustFabs Buys FabKids, PANDO (Jan. 18,
2013), http://pando.com/2013/01/18/mother-and-child-reunion-justfab-buys-fabkids/.
9 See Sarah Perez, FabKids Launches Subscription-based Kids Clothing Service, Ac-
tress Christina Applegate Partners, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/
08/02/fabkids-launches-subscription-based-kids-clothing-service-actress-christina-applegate-
partners/.
10 See, e.g., Ross S. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect
When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427, 452 (2013).
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kets, but in fact they are heavily regulated.  Only “accredited investors”
can purchase large amounts of private equity.11  The two types of accred-
ited investors who participate in the private equity market, angels and
venture capitalists, are driven by market dynamics to use different strate-
gies.  Most angel groups invest about $400,000 per company, while most
venture capitalist firms invest about $7 million per company.12  This
leads to “lumpy” startup investment.  It is well documented that startups
have trouble raising between $1 and $5 million, a range that has become
commonly known as the “Series A gap.”13  Many claim that this gap
results from a liquidity problem, which is often referred to as the “Se-
ries A crunch.”14  This Article is the first to use game theory—in particu-
lar, concepts of hold-out and free rider problems—to show how this
private equity gap may also result from a market failure.
In 2012, Congress amended securities law to enable a new way to
finance startups.  The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of
2012 is a law that creates a new exemption to securities laws.15  It ex-
empts “crowdfunding” from the Securities Act of 1933, allowing startups
to sell $1 million of private equity to the general public.16  Crowdfunding
will introduce a new participant, “crowds,” into the private equity mar-
ket, which consist of members of the general public who do not necessa-
rily have any particular accreditation or sophistication about investing.
Crowds invest pursuant to a different set of dynamics than either angels
or venture capitalists.17 Crowds could provide the liquidity needed to
avoid the Series A crunch.
Unfortunately, the JOBS Act only allows startups to raise $1 million
per year through crowdfunding, which does not address the Series A
gap.18  Instead, it merely allows the general public to compete with pro-
fessional angel investors to make the first investment in startup compa-
11 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015) (defining “accredited investor” as that term is used
in Regulation D).
12 Seed Investing Report—Startup Orphans and the Series A Crunch, CB INSIGHTS (Dec.
19, 2012), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/seed-investing-report/.
13 See, e.g., John Pletz, Lightbank Looks to Plug the Series A Gap, CRAIN’S CHICAGO
BUS. (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130326/BLOGS11/
130329828/lightbank-looks-to-plug-the-series-a-gap (“There are a lot of quality seed-stage
companies that have done well but not well enough to get over the hump.”).
14 See Rebecca Grant, Watch Out for Bigfoot!  ‘Series A Crunch’ Sighting Reported in
Silicon Valley, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 25, 2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/03/25/watch-out-
for-bigfoot-series-a-crunch-sighting-reported-in-silicon-valley/ (“The Series A crunch has left
the realm of Bigfoot and Nessie and is entering the realm of truth, at least according to Fen-
wick & West.”).
15 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
16 See id.
17 See, e.g., Laura M. Hughes, Crowdfunding: Putting a Cap on the Risks for Unsophisti-
cated Investors, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 483 (2014).
18 See id.
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nies.19  316,600 angels seed-funded 73,400 U.S. startup companies in
2014, when they invested $24.1 billion at an average of $328,300 per
company.20  There is already a substantial contributor to sub-million-dol-
lar startup capitalization.  The JOBS Act pits crowdfunding investors di-
rectly against the more established, sophisticated, and connected angels.
As designed by the drafters of the JOBS Act, the $1 million cap is
intended to protect the general public from investment fraud or from sim-
ply making outright poor investment decisions.21  Instead, it makes
crowdfunding expensive, complicated, inefficient, and risky for unso-
phisticated investors.  For example, the JOBS Act requires startups to
spend up to $150,000 (e.g., to obtain independent audits, disclosure doc-
uments, filing fees, and legal fees) before selling equity via crowdfund-
ing.22  Raising money from angel investors is not only up to six times
cheaper than crowdfunding, but angel investment costs are mostly in-
curred after financing is assured, whereas startups have to sink costs up
front in order to try crowdfunding.23  Under current regulations, there-
fore, it seems that only startups that are unable to get angel funding will
seek crowdfunding.
This Article presents a new solution that uses crowdfunding to solve
the Series A gap.  The JOBS Act fundamentally misunderstood
crowdfunding.24  However, if existing crowdfunding limitations were in-
verted—such that startups had a $1 million floor and a $5 million ceil-
ing—it would become rational for high-quality startups to seek
crowdfunding for gap financing.  This Article coins the term
“bridgefunding” to describe such a regulatory regime.  Bridgefunding ac-
complishes more than providing capital to fill a gap in the private equity
market.  Bridgefunding also leverages the ability of crowds to enhance
the startup financing cycle.
Bridgefunding allows crowdfunding to become cost effective with-
out reducing fraud protections such as disclosure requirements.  It is
harder to commit bridgefunding fraud because angels have already vetted
19 See id.
20 Jeffrey Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2014: A Market Correction in Deal Size,
CTR. FOR VENTURE RESEARCH (May 14, 2015), https://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege
.unh.edu/files/webform/2014%20Analysis%20Report.pdf.
21 See, e.g., Van S. Wiltz, Will the JOBS Act Jump-Start the Video Game Industry?
Crowdfunding Start-Up Capital, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 141, 164 (2013).
22 Sherwood Neiss, It Might Cost You $39k to Crowdfund $100k Under the SEC’s New
Rules, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 2, 2014), http://venturebeat.com/2014/01/02/it-might-cost-you-
39k-to-crowdfund-100k-under-the-secs-new-rules/ (explaining a recent SEC cost–benefit re-
port that looked at success fees, compliance costs, and costs of CPA review or audit).
23 As of the date of this publication, the SEC has not finalized and promulgated its
crowdfunding regulations, so analysis here is based on the proposed final rules.  For the pro-
posed rule, see Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,427 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 & 249).
24 See infra Part II.
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and continue to monitor the startup when crowds invest.  Portals could
further reduce crowdfunding investor risk by encouraging individuals to
diversify their investments; as the central nexus for investment, portals
can make it easier to invest small amounts in multiple companies by
aggregating, synthesizing, and analyzing information about investment
opportunities.  Additionally, bridgefunding introduces a valuable new
signal to the private equity market.  Bridgefunding could signal to ven-
ture capitalists that consumers are likely to desire a product.  This may
create a positive feedback loop where crowdfunded companies are more
likely to obtain venture capital, thus making crowdfunding more
successful.
Part I of this Article explains the startup funding lifecycle.  It exam-
ines the investor dynamics that continue to perpetuate the Series A gap,
examines data evidencing a private equity liquidity crunch, and in-
troduces crowdfunding.  Part II introduces “bridgefunding,” a new way
that securities regulation can solve the private equity gap and leverage
the wisdom of crowds.  Part II also addresses criticisms of crowdfunding,
considers whether bridgefunding alleviates or aggravates those criti-
cisms, and suggests some costs and benefits of bridgefunding that have
not yet been addressed in the crowdfunding literature.  Part III delves
deeper into the theory of bridgefunding.  This Part uses game theory to
explain why there is a gap in the private equity market and also explores
why alternative exemptions fail to fill the gap.  This Article concludes by
reviewing the competitive advantage of crowds to fund the gap.
I. STARTUP INVESTMENT
Equity is the financial fuel of the innovation economy.  There are
two main types of purchasers who fuel startup development through their
investment in equity securities: angel investors and venture capitalists.25
The differences between these two players in the private equity market
have led to a gap in startup financing.26  Section A of this Part reviews
how startup private equity works by discussing both angel and venture
investment in the private equity market, describing how private equity
investments drive what is called the startup financing cycle, and explain-
ing a gap in this cycle where fundraising is especially difficult.  Section
B introduces crowdfunding, a new regulatory regime that will allow a
third type of investor, the general public, to invest in the private equity
market by buying startup stock online.
25 Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should En-
courage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 111 (2010).
26 See Seth Oranburg, The Law & Economics of the Series A Gap, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/04/06/the-law-economics-of-the-se-
ries-a-gap/.
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A. The Startup Private Equity Market
Startups raise money from “angels” and “venture capitalists” (or
“VCs”) primarily by selling preferred stock to these two types of inves-
tors.27  Startups are generally corporations,28 which is one type of com-
pany that separates ownership and control.  The stockholders technically
own the corporation, but the board of directors (who are appointed by the
stockholders) has authority and controls the corporation’s actions.29
Shareholders have limited rights under corporate law to control a corpo-
ration that they own, but shareholders can negotiate for contract rights of
control.  Contractual control rights (like the right of shareholders to pre-
vent the company from issuing more stock, to obtain financial informa-
tion about the corporation, to prevent other shareholders from selling the
corporation’s stock, or to have a representative on the board of directors)
are often found in preferred stock purchase agreements.
The key point is that raising money by selling stock is different than
taking out a loan because a startup gives up a percentage of the company
along with some measure of control when it sells equity.30  The relation-
ship between the company and its equity investors can last the com-
pany’s entire lifetime.  Startup equity investment is often a long-term
commitment.  Central to understanding the startup private equity market
is realizing that such investments are rarely passive.  Angels and VCs
compete for startups by providing guidance and services.  They are
“more than money,”31 but they are also the only source of money.  This
creates the unique dynamic called the startup financing cycle.
27 See, e.g., What Are Some Basics to Know About Startup Investing?, FUNDERSCLUB,
https://fundersclub.com/learn/startup-investing/getting-started/basics-to-know-about-startup-
investing/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (“Individuals who invest in startups are called angel
investors . . . whereas firms that are set up to invest in startups are called Venture Capi-
tal firms . . . .”).  Stock is a type of equity, and equity reflects an ownership right in a company.
28 See Kyle Hulten, Why C Corporations Are the Preferred Entity for Tech Startups,
INVIGOR LAW (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.invigorlaw.com/corporations-best-entities-tech-
startups/ (explaining that the C corporation is ideal for startups because investors do not have
to worry about pass-through tax or daily corporate decision-making, it is easy to grant equity
to employees in the form of stock options, it is easy to grant preferential rights to investors as
compared to founders and employees, investors pay capital gains rates on dividends instead of
ordinary income rates on partnership distributions, and because the C corporation structure is
familiar to founders, investors, employees and their counsel and accountants).
29 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 969 (2006).
30 Id.
31 See Joseph Menn, Andreessen Expands Venture Capital Business, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af5c1a7c-e717-11df-880d-00144feab49a.html#axzz3MHe3l
njx.
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1. Private Equity Market Participants
As discussed, there are two main types of investors in the private
equity market: angels and VCs.32 These investors are purchasers of pri-
vate equity.33  In 2014, 316,600 individual angels invested $24.1 billion
in 73,400 startups34—an average of $328,300 per angel investment—
while 803 VC firms invested $49.3 billion in 4,361 companies35—an
average of $11.3 million per VC investment.  In other words, despite
investing a similar total amount, the average VC investment per round is
thirty-five times that of the average angel investment.  Accordingly, an-
gel and VC investment strategies are quite different.  Angels form groups
to invest small amounts of their own money in brand new startups.36
VCs form funds to invest large amounts of other people’s money in more
mature startups.37  While the angels and VCs currently provide the vast
majority of traditional startup investment, the JOBS Act may allow a
new type of investor to enter the marketplace: the general public.
Figure 1: Angels and VCs historically invested a similar total amount per year (about
$25B).38
32 See supra Part I.A.
33 See Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/content/venture-
capital (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
34 Sohl, supra note 20. R
35 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, YEARBOOK 2015, at 38 figs.3.10 & 3.11 (2015),
http://nvca.org/research/stats-studies/.
36 See George Deeb, How to Find Angel Investors for Your Startup, FORBES (Sept. 19,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgedeeb/2014/09/19/how-to-find-angel-investors-for-
your-startup/.
37 See Dan Primack, VC Deals Are Down, but VC Deal Sizes Are WAY Up, FORTUNE
(July 3, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/03/vc-deals-are-down-but-vc-deal-sizes-are-way-
up/.
38 Data aggregated from CVR Analysis Reports, UNIV. OF N.H., https://paulcollege.unh
.edu/research/center-venture-research/cvr-analysis-reports (last visited Feb. 28, 2016); NAT’L
VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, at 38 fig.3.10. R
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Figure 2: On average, angels invest three or four hundred thousand dollars in each star-
tup, whereas VCs invest several million dollars in each round.39
a. Startups
The main seller of private equity in the startup private equity market
is, unsurprisingly, the startup.  But, it is important from the outset to
distinguish startups from small business, as it is common to conflate
these very different types of business entities.40  Distinguishing between
the two is important because private equity investment works for star-
tups, not for small businesses.
The angel and venture capital investment model is to purchase re-
stricted stock—which cannot be easily resold—to hold for a limited
number of years.41  This investment is very risky, so the objective is to
obtain geometric returns when an investment is successful.42  A startup is
the sort of high-growth, high-risk enterprise that appeals to this invest-
ment model.  Startups are designed to grow quickly.43
39 Data aggregated from CVR Analysis Reports, supra note 38; NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL
ASS’N, supra note 35, at 38 figs.3.10 & 3.11.
40 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Sign-
ing (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-
jobs-act-bill-signing (describing President Barack Obama as proclaiming when he signed the
JOBS Act into law, “startups and small business will now have access to a big, new pool of
potential investors—namely, the American people”).
41 JACK S. LEVIN ET AL., STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND EN-
TREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶ 103 (2009).
42 Id.
43 See Startups & High Growth Busineses, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N., https://www.sba
.gov/content/startups-high-growth-businesses (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“In the world of bus-
iness, the word ‘startup’ goes beyond a company just getting off the ground.  The term startup
is also associated with a business that is typically technology oriented and has high growth
potential.  Startups have some unique struggles, especially in regard to financing. That’s be-
cause investors are looking for the highest potential return on investment, while balancing the
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A small business, on the other hand—like a bike store, cobbler’s
shop, deli, espresso cafe, or food truck44—is designed to grow sustain-
ably.  Small businesses are wonderful and vital for the American econ-
omy.  They provide employment opportunities for millions of
Americans.  But they generally make terrible equity investments.45  Half
of small businesses fail in their first five years.46  Although this is similar
to the 52% failure rate of startups,47 small businesses do not grow expo-
nentially as startups do, so equity investors who invest in small busi-
nesses would get the same risk as with investing in startups but with far
lower returns.  That is why small businesses are mostly financed with
owner investment and an average of $80,000 a year in bank credit.48  It is
unrealistic, therefore, that private equity markets will provide a signifi-
cant source of financing for small businesses.
While a small business might be able to use a small bank loan to
become self sufficient, startups require millions of dollars to grow
quickly before they are profitable as a stand-alone business.  High-
growth startups use money to scale quickly, which is important to win
the race to register a patent or build a two-sided network.49  For example,
consider a famous startup story.  Facebook was first funded on Septem-
ber 1, 2004 by two angels who invested $500,000, which Facebook used
to build a basic web application that the founders deployed at Harvard
University.50  Less than a year later, Facebook received $12.7 million in
a Series A financing from the venture firm, Accel Partners, in May 1,
2005, which it used to develop core social infrastructure and expand to
more U.S. universities and international student networks.51  Facebook
associated risks.”); see also Candice Landau, What’s the Difference Between a Small Business
Venture and a Startup?, BPLANS, http://articles.bplans.com/whats-difference-small-business-
venture-startup/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
44 All of these are examples from Inc. Magazine’s article, 10 Inspiring Success Stories,
INC., http://www.inc.com/ss/10-inspiring-small-business-success-stories (last visited Jan. 30,
2015).
45 In future work, the author of this Article will discuss how crowdlending might be an
excellent source of funding for small business.
46 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N OFFICE OF ADVOCACY,
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sbfaq.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
47 See generally ROBERT WILTBANK & WARREN BOEKER, RETURNS TO ANGEL INVES-
TORS IN GROUPS (2007), http://sites.kauffman.org/pdf/angel_groups_111207.pdf.
48 Id.
49 See Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Strategies for Two-Sided Markets, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Oct. 2006 (stating that competition lucrative for two-sided networks such as PC operating
systems, credit card networks, and internet advertisements have a winner-take-all dynamic that
requires operating on razor-thin margins or even giving subsidies to build the network).
50 See Brian Caulfield & Nicole Perlroth, Life After Facebook, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0214/features-peter-thiel-social-media-life-after-facebook
.html.
51 Facebook, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/facebook/fund-
ing-rounds (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
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needed a huge infusion of cash to expand rapidly, illustrating that $1 mil-
lion is not a lot of money for a startup.  Many startups raise millions of
dollars throughout the startup financing cycle.52  Accordingly, this Arti-
cle focuses on the startups, not small business.
b. Angel Investors
Angels are professionals who invest their own money in startups.53
Traditionally, angels were hard to find.  Throughout the late 1980s, these
wealthy gurus connected with startups through informal and even secre-
tive channels.54  In the early 1990s, angels began to form groups and
publicize their activities.55  The first prominent angel investment group
formed in 1994.56  Silicon Valley’s “Band of Angels” began with twelve
members and grew to 110 members by 1998.57  From then on, angel
groups sprouted up throughout the United States.  The number of regis-
tered angel groups has tripled since 1999.58  The Angel Capital Associa-
tion estimates that there are between 10,000 and 15,000 angel groups
operating in the United States today, with an average of 42 members per
group.59  Many of these angel groups now have a prominent website that
contains a contract form, public membership list, and even a list of port-
folio companies.60
Not all angels invest in groups.  Some of the most popular angels
continue to invest in the traditional, solitary, and secretive way.  Many of
these traditional angels—like Peter Thiel (who seeded Facebook) and
Naval Ravikant (who funded Twitter and Uber)—are famous for build-
ing groundbreaking startups or investing early in hugely successful
ventures.
Not everyone can be an angel.  Legally, an angel must be an “ac-
credited investor,” someone with at least $1 million in net wealth or
52 See Brian Solomon, These 11 Startups Raised Over $1 Billion Before They Had a
Product, FORBES (June 11, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/06/11/
these-11-startups-raised-over-1-billion-combined-before-launching/.
53 What Is an Angel Investor?, ANGEL CAPITAL ASS’N, http://www.angelcapitalassocia-
tion.org/faqs/#What_is_an_angel_investor_ (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
54 Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1405, 1443 (2008) (explaining how the investment contract design of angel stock
purchase agreements can be understood through a historical shift from informal modes of
secretive operations to formal mechanisms and public group operations).
55 John May, Structured Angel Groups in the USA: The Dinner Club Experience, 4 VEN-
TURE CAPITAL 337, 339 (2002).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 FAQs About Angel Groups, ANGEL CAPITAL ASS’N, http://www.angelcapitalassocia-
tion.org/press-center/angel-group-faq/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., HYDE PARK ANGELS, http://www.hydeparkangels.com/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2016).
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$200,000 in annual income.61  The U.S. census counts household wealth,
not individual wealth, so estimates for the number of potential angels
varies, but 9.63 million American households had a net worth of $1 mil-
lion or more in 2013,62 which is about 3% of the U.S. population.63  The
Angel Capital Association estimates that about 4 million potential angels
reside in the United States.64
Despite the large number of potential angels, only about 300,000
Americans made an angel investment in the past two years.65  This is
partially because an angel should have a solid understanding of business
planning, corporate finance, preferred stock investment, and market con-
ditions, plus a risk-seeking constitution.66  Angel investment is not for
everyone.
c. Venture Capital Investors
Venture capitalists are professional, institutional money managers
of risk capital.  VCs create funds in which large institutional investors
(such as pension funds and university endowments) invest.  VCs then
“deploy” that capital primarily by purchasing startup equities.  The na-
ture of venture capital investment is quite different from angel invest-
ment because VCs manage other people’s money, whereas angels invest
their own money.  Venture funds raise sums of money far in excess of
most angels’ personal net wealth,67 and VCs have to deploy this money
very quickly because the funds typically have eight to twelve year life
spans.68  When the fund’s life is over, the capital must be returned.
Venture capital funds have grown dramatically since 1985, both in
terms of the number of VC funds and the average amount that each VC
fund manages.  From 1985 to 2014, 2,054 VC firms were founded.69
These firms raised 5,062 funds totaling over $599 billion.70  While the
number of VC funds has increased dramatically, the number of VC fund
61 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2013).
62 Number of U.S. Millionaires Hits New High, CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2014), http://
money.cnn.com/2014/03/14/news/economy/us-millionaires-households/.
63 Robert Schlesinger, The 2014 U.S. and World Populations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/2013/12/
31/us-population-2014-317-million-and-71-billion-in-the-world.
64 See FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58.
65 Id.
66 See WILTBANK & BOEKER, supra note 47 (asserting that due diligence, experience, and
participation are the three largest factors impacting the outcome of angel investments).
67 See, e.g., Dan Primack, NEA Raising Largest VC Fund of All Time, FORTUNE (Oct. 27,
2014), http://fortune.com/2014/10/27/exclusive-nea-raising-largest-vc-fund-of-all-time/.  The
VC firm NEA recently raised a fund with nearly $3 billion in capital.
68 Allen Wagner, The Venture Capital Lifecycle, PITCHBOOK (May 14, 2014), http://
blog.pitchbook.com/the-venture-capital-lifecycle/.
69 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, at 20 fig.1.04. R
70 Id.
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managers has not.  In 1994, there were 3,735 VC professionals managing
$33.2 billion—about $9 million per manager.71  In 2014, there were
5,680 VC professionals managing $156.5 billion—about $28 million per
manager, more than a three-fold increase in money under management
per manager.72  Put simply, there is a similar number of people managing
a far larger amount of money, so they will tend to make larger
investments.73
VC funds focus on high technology investments.  These funds in-
vested $5.2 billion in the information technology industry in 2014,74
which accounted for 72% of total investments that year.75  VCs increas-
ingly focus on follow-on investment.  In other words, VCs frequently
fund the same company several different times throughout the startup
financing lifecycle.  In fact, over 85% of VC investments in 2014 were
follow-on investments.76  Despite making 4,361 investments in 2014,
VCs only invested in 404 new non-high-technology companies that
year.77
Figure 3: VC investors increased dramatically both in size and number around the year
2000, and the average capital managed by a single investor almost tripled, although there
have been corrections since the Great Recession in the mid-2000s.78
Like angel investment, venture fund investment is not for everyone.
Only “qualified purchasers”—those individuals who are natural persons
owning $5 million or more in investments, or funds owning $25 million
71 Id. at 9 fig.1.0.
72 Id.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 32 fig.3.02.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 56 fig.3.19.
77 Id. at 12 fig.5.0.
78 Data aggregated from NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, at 19 fig.1.02
& 21 fig.1.05.
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or more in investments79—can invest in venture capital funds.  This
means that many angels cannot invest in venture capital funds.  The only
way such angels can get involved in the startup private equity market is
by making investments before VCs do.  Accordingly, angels and venture
capitalists play supporting roles by investing in different stages of startup
development.  This model of staged investment is called the startup fi-
nancing cycle.
2. The Startup Private Equity Financing Cycle
Startups generally do not raise money only once, so it is very impor-
tant to understand the entire startup fundraising cycle in order to under-
stand the startup private equity market.  The startup fundraising cycle is a
multi-step process through which startups raise money at distinct
periods.80
“Seedfunding” is the beginning of the startup financing cycle.  Star-
tups use seedfunding to research, assess, and develop an initial concept.81
“[F]riends, family, and ‘fools’” (fools referring to the high risk associ-
ated with investment in nascent startups) provide a small amount of seed-
funding,82 although angel investors provide most seedfunding capital.83
Once a startup receives seedfunding, the company begins operations
and enters the “seed valley of death,” where companies require signifi-
cant capital inflows but have little or no revenue.84  Startups begin to
leave the perilous seed valley of death when their revenue increases
enough to cover all monthly fixed and variable costs.  This is called the
“break even.”85
After the break even, a startup enters an “early stage,” where ven-
ture capital firms become substantially more interested in investing in
that startup.86  Startups decidedly exit the seed valley of death when a
venture capital firm makes its first early stage investment, called “Se-
ries A.”87  After this point, venture capital investors frequently reinvest
in the startup in Series B, C, D and so on, so the startup can afford to
79 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(A) (2012).
80 Oranburg, supra note 26. R
81 DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY
CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2d ed. 2014).
82 Id. at 6.
83 Id. (citing Andrew W. Wong, Angel Finance: The ‘Other’ Venture Capital, (Univer-
sity of Chicago, Working Paper, (2002)); see also Laura Entis, Where Startup Funding Really
Comes From, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/230011.
84 CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 81.
85 Id. at 7.
86 Id.
87 See id.
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invest in growth even if doing so causes net profits to become negative
again.88
Small venture capital firms may only make early stage investments.
Large venture capital firms make “later stage” investments all the way up
to the end of the startup financing cycle, when a startup ceases to be a
startup.  The cycle ends badly when the startup goes broke and liquidates
or sells the fledgling operations at a discount.  The cycle ends well when
the startup is sold to another company through a profitable acquisition or
a merger.  The ultimate conclusion to a startup is when the startup goes
public and accesses the public capital markets through an initial public
offering (IPO).  The IPO is the preferred mode of exit—the ideal end of
the startup financing cycle—for most investors to divest their
investments.89
This Article examines newer data that indicates the Series A gap has
become greater, meaning that more companies who receive seedfunding
will not receive Series A funding, as illustrated by the chart below.
Figure 4: The Startup Financing Cycle
The above chart illustrates that, from 2008 to 2014, angel seed in-
vestment has increased while VC seed investment has decreased.  This
substantially contributes to the Series A gap and Series A crunch.  Dur-
ing the relevant period, annual angel investment steadily rose from
55,480 deals to 73,400 deals.90  Meanwhile, VC investments fell from
1966 to 740.91
88 See id.
89 Id. at 596.
90 See CVR Analysis Reports, supra note 38.
91 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, at 38 fig.3.10.
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3. The Series A Gap in the Private Equity Market
Seedfunding is only the first step in the startup financing cycle, and
startups rarely survive on seedfunding alone.  As Professor Darian M.
Ibrahim writes:
Venture capital is crucial to a start-up’s success, but it is
not immediately available to most start-ups.  Most ven-
ture capitalists fund start-ups that have survived their
earliest stages and are expanding, for instance by deliv-
ering products and services to customers, or are prepar-
ing for an IPO or private sale.  Nor is venture capital
readily available in the smaller amounts that might be
appropriate for very young companies.  A typical ven-
ture round averages between $2 million and $10 million,
although it can be much higher.  Therefore, venture capi-
talists leave a critical funding gap that has both time and
capital components.  The time gap is present during the
earliest stage of a start-up’s life, which commonly lasts
at least one year.92
In other words, between the seedfunding relative maxima of
$350,801 and the Series A relative maxima of $4.87 million, there is a
minimum of startup investment.  Successful angel investor, Bill Payne,
has studied these maxima and minima.  In 2011, he produced what he
termed the “Funding Gap”:
Let’s look at some numbers: Hundreds of thousands of
friends and family invest an estimated $50 billion or
more in startup companies every year in the US.  It is
estimated that more than 200,000 angel investors fund
50,000 companies with $20 billion annually.  And, the
1,000 or so VC firms also invest about $20 billion in
1,000 new companies every year.  But, I estimate that
less than 200 (and probably less than 100) investors pro-
vide funding in the gap between angels and VCs, that is,
rounds of investment between $1 million and $4 million.
Finding investors is always difficult, but finding capital
in The Funding Gap is like seeking a needle in the pro-
verbial haystack.93
92 Ibrahim, supra note 54, at 1416. R
93 The Funding Gap, BILL PAYNE & ASSOCIATES, (Jan. 20, 2011). http://billpayne.com/
2011/01/20/the-funding-gap-2.html.
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Figure 5: The Funding Gap © 2011 Bill Payne
The chart above shows that startup investment is lumpy.  It tends to
happen in specific times and in specific amounts.  Angels typically invest
less than $1 million at the Series Seed stage.94  Venture firms typically
invest more than $5 million at the Series A stage.95 The result is that it is
virtually impossible for an entrepreneur who needs $3.5 million to find
investors.96
Since Professor Ibrahim’s article from 2008 and Mr. Payne’s article
from 2011, the typical venture round has grown while the typical angel
round has shrunk.  As such, this Article argues that the gap has increased.
The leading venture law firm, Fenwick & West LLP, has empiri-
cally demonstrated that the gap is a persistent and growing phenome-
non.97  Fenwick’s 2012 study of seedfunding found that there is an
increasing institutionalization of seed financing.98  In other words, there
are fewer traditional (solo, secretive) angels out there.  Angels are form-
ing more visible groups that use technology to connect with potential
investments.
In 2014, angels invested $24.1 billion in a total of 73,400 startups
(an average of $328,300 per angel deal).99  Venture capital firms—on
whom angels and crowdfunding investors rely to provide additional
funding from Series A to IPO—invested $49.3 billion in a total of 4,361
deals (an average of $11.3 million per venture deal).100  Of these venture
capital deals, venture capital firms invested $9.896 billion in 2,031 early
stage deals (an average of $4.87 million per early stage deal).101  Be-
94 David H. Freedman, The Great Funding Flameout, 35 INC. 78, 82  (2013).
95 Id.
96 The Funding Gap, supra note 93. R
97 Barry J. Kramer & Steven S. Levine, Seed Finance Survey 2012, FENWICK & WEST
LLP (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/2012_Seed_Survey_Re
port.pdf.
98 Id.
99 Sohl, supra note 20. R
100 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, at figs.3.10 & 3.11.
101 Id.
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tween these two peaks of investment at $0.3 million and $11.3 million is
a valley where funding is increasingly hard to find.102  The valley
reaches a critical low point—a gap—between about $1 to $5 million,
where startups fail because funds are in such short supply.
4. Gap Problems for Startups and Investors
The Series A gap causes problems for many startups.  Angel inves-
tor Mason Myers of Greybull Stewardship has observed that “traditional
Series A does not fit many companies.”103  Amar Bhide´,104 in his article,
Bootstrap Finance: The Art of Start-ups,105 summarily explains, “belief
in a ‘big money’ model of entrepreneurship . . . has little in common with
the traditional low-budget start-up.”106  Venture capital investors look for
high growth starters founded by successful entrepreneurship experi-
ence.107  As a result, there are endless startups that build iPhone applica-
tions and similar products.  But companies that design hardware or
biotechnology—and the entire life science startup field in general—
struggle to access capital.108
Lately there has been a remarkable increase in seedfunded startup
failures.  These failures have occurred as a result of a phenomenon
known as the “Series A crunch.”109  Companies that obtain seedfunding
but fail to receive Series A funding before they run out of capital get
“crunched.”  The crunch threatens the success of the startup revolution.
Slate Magazine reports, “[o]ne thousand startups will be orphaned; many
will die.  One billion dollars will have gone for naught.  Bright young
minds across the country will be out of work.”110  Startup-focused web-
site, Launch, published a “Series A Crunch Survivor’s Guide.”111  More
pessimistic observers such as Richard Meyer of the Capital Formation
Institute called this the “Start-Up Enterprise Valley of Death” and re-
102 See FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58 (noting that angel groups may invest in R
the gap between individual angels and venture capitalists).
103 Mason Myers, We’re In Seed-Stage Boom, Not a Series A Crunch, MASON MYERS
BLOG (Apr. 6, 2014), http://masonmyers.com/seed-stage-boom-times-not-series-a-crunch/.
104 Thomas Schmidheiny Professor of International Business, Tufts University.
105 Amar Bhide´, Bootstrap Finance: The Art of Start-ups, 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 109
(1992).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 111.
108 Laura Lorek, More Venture Capital Needed for Life Science Startups, SILICON HILLS
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.siliconhillsnews.com/2014/12/04/more-venture-capital-needed-for-
life-science-startups/.
109 See, e.g., Grant, supra note 14. R
110 Will Oremus, Tech Startups Are about to Start Dropping like Flies, SLATE (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/12/20/series_a_crunch_tech_startups_
are_about_to_start_dropping_like_flies.html.
111 The Series A Crunch Survivor’s Guide, LAUNCH (Jan. 2, 2013), http://blog.launch.co/
blog/the-series-a-crunch-survivors-guide.html.
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marked that “[i]ts width ranges from $2,000,000 to $10,000,000, dictated
by the minimum investment that VC firms prefer to invest to match their
costs of management.”112
Data show that the Series A crunch is a serious problem.  Fenwick’s
2012 Seed Financing Survey reported that the “number of seed financ-
ings increased from 472 in 2009 to 1749 in 2012, while the number of
Series A rounds only increased from 418 to 692 during the same pe-
riod.”113  This indicates that the Series A gap has become greater, mean-
ing that more companies who receive seedfunding will not receive
Series A funding, as illustrated by the chart below.
Figure 6: While angels continue to make more seed-stage investments each year, VC
seedfunding has dropped to less than half of 2008 levels.114
GeekWire reported warnings of a Series A crunch in early 2013.
The above chart illustrates the ratio of companies that received seedfund-
ing to the number of seedfunded companies that received Series A fund-
ing.115  CB Insights, which maintains the Venture Capital Database,116
reported in late 2012 that only about 40% of seed-funded companies will
112 Richard Meyer, The Start-Up Enterprise Valley of Death, CAPITAL FORMATION INST.,
http://www.cfi-institute.org/VP - The Start-Up Enterprise Valley of Death - Meyer.html (last
visited Dec. 21, 2014).
113 Kramer & Levine, supra note 97, at 3. R
114 Data aggregated from CVR Analysis Reports, supra note 38; NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL
ASS’N, supra note 35, at 38 fig.3.10.
115 John Cook, The Series A Crunch Is Alive and Well, GEEKWIRE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://
www.geekwire.com/2013/chart-series-crunch-real/.  The ratio increased from 1.9:1 in 2009 to
3.3:1 in 2012.
116 Seed Investing Report—Startup Orphans and the Series A Crunch, CB INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/seed-investing-report/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
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raise a Series A round.117  This dramatically increases the risk associated
with forming, joining, or investing in a startup company, and thus chills
those desirable behaviors.
B. The Market for Entrepreneurial Finance
The JOBS Act of 2012 created the possibility of a new entrant into
the private equity market.  In addition to the established investors—an-
gels and VCs—the JOBS Act will permit the general public to invest in
the market for entrepreneurial finance through “crowdfunding.”118  This
Article refers to that general investing public as “crowds.”
Crowdfunding has a general and specific meaning in the context of
this Article.  Crowdfunding can be generally understood as “the practice
of funding a project or venture by raising many small amounts of money
from a large number of people, typically via the Internet.”119
Crowdfunding in this sense has been occurring at least since 2005 with
the founding of Kiva.120
Since Kiva began in 2005, over a million people have made interest-
free crowdfunded microloans to impoverished entrepreneurs through
Kiva.121  Now, crowdfunding is popular on Kickstarter.com, where, for
example, an initiative called the Pebble Smartwatch project raised $10
million by pre-selling the finished project.122  Small businesses start and
grow with for-profit crowdfunded loans from InvestNextDoor.com123
and Lending Club.124  The Oceti Sakowin Indian tribe offered a thank
you reward to everyone who contributed $20 to save the Black Hills and
117 See id.
118 See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfund-
ing (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13705400176
77.
119 Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, FORBES
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-
and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.
120 Terry Waghorn, Premal Shah: Loans that Change Lives, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2013), http:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/terrywaghorn/2013/11/04/premal-shah-loans-that-change-lives/ (noting
that Kiva is “a global microfinance organization that connects borrowers who need funding to
launch poverty-transforming businesses with socially minded lenders who have as little as $25
to invest in their success”).
121 About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
122 Angela Moscaritolo, Pebble Smartwatch Sells Out, Collects $10 Million on Kick-
starter, PC MAGAZINE (May 10, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2404295,00
.asp.
123 See generally Pre-Launch Guide for Your Small Business Crowdlending Campaign,
INVESTNEXTDOOR (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.investnextdoor.com/blog/guide-preparing-
small-business-crowdlending-campaign/.
124 See generally LENDINGCLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/business/ (last visited Jan.
12, 2015).
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other Sioux sacred land on Indiegogo.125  These are examples of the don-
ative, pre-ordering, rewards, and lending models of crowdfunding.
On the other hand, equity crowdfunding—which is selling a small
amount of stock to a large number of people via web sites called funding
portals—was illegal until the JOBS Act created a new exemption to the
Securities Act of 1933.126  A more specific definition of crowdfunding
for present purposes relates expressly to equity crowdfunding as permit-
ted by the JOBS Act and SEC rules:
Regulation Crowdfunding would prescribe rules gov-
erning the offer and sale of securities under new Section
4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 1933.  The proposal also
would provide a framework for the regulation of regis-
tered funding portals and brokers that issuers are re-
quired to use as intermediaries in the offer and sale of
securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6).  In addition, the
proposal would exempt securities sold pursuant to Sec-
tion 4(a)(6) from the registration requirements of Section
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.127
The JOBS Act amends Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 1933
(the Securities Act)128 to allow a private corporation to offer and sell up
to $1 million worth of equity securities (stock) in a twelve-month period
to the general public without registering the securities with the SEC.129
This new exemption to registration under the Securities Act is generally
called “crowdfunding,” although it is more specifically called “equity
crowdfunding.”130
Equity crowdfunding will be allowed when the SEC promulgates its
final rules131—which at the time of this publication are overdue132—al-
though some of the crowdfunding rules are provided in the JOBS Act
itself.  Individuals who have between $100,000 and $1 million in annual
income or net worth may invest 10% of it each year in startups through
125 See generally Pe’ Sla: Help Save Lakota Sioux Sacred Land!, INDIEGOGO, https://www
.indiegogo.com/projects/pe-sla-help-save-lakota-sioux-sacred-land (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
126 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012).
127 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,427 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240 & 249).
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6).
129 See id.
130 See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions About
Crowdfunding Intermediaries, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm.
131 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 303(b), 126 Stat. 306,
321 (2012).
132 See id. Rulemaking was due “not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of
this Act,” which was signed into law on April 5, 2012.  Id.
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crowdfunding.133  Individuals who have or annually earn less than
$100,000 may invest the greater of $2,000 or 5% of their annual income
each year in startups.134
The JOBS Act also creates the new term “funding portal,” which is
a financial intermediary that can sell startup stock online to non-accred-
ited investors.135  A private company raising capital under the
crowdfunding exemption from the Securities Act must sell the stock
through either a registered broker-dealer or a funding portal.136  Any bro-
ker-dealer or funding portal that engages in crowdfunding must register
with the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA).137  The funding portal may not solicit transactions for securi-
ties displayed on its website or portal, compensate anyone for soliciting
investors, pay compensation based on the sale of securities on its website
or portal, hold customer funds or securities, or offer investment advice or
recommendations.138
All of these regulations come at a price.  The SEC estimates that
raising $100,000 may cost up to $39,000 in portal and compliance
fees.139  Raising $1,000,000 may cost up to $151,660.140  In comparison,
raising a similar amount of money from angels through series seed pre-
ferred stock financing pursuant to Regulation D Rule 506141 costs be-
tween $10,000 and $30,000 in legal fees.142  This huge cost difference
disfavoring crowdfunding begs the question: Why would startups choose
to use this vastly more expensive fundraising method when equity fun-
draising alternatives are widely available?
133 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
134 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i).
135 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80).
136 Id.
137 See generally Funding Portals, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/issues/funding-
portals (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
138 Id.
139 See Neiss, supra note 22. R
140 Id.
141 See infra Part III.B.  Equity fundraising involves the sale of unregistered securities, so
it must be done under an exemption from the Securities Act.  Regulation D (or Reg D) con-
tains three rules (Rules 504, 505, and 506) providing exemption from registration, and they
will be discussed in greater depth later on in this Article.  Rule 504 allows startups to sell up to
$1 million of securities in one of three ways: (1) in a general solicitation to non-accredited
investors with a disclosure document, (2) in a general solicitation to accredited investors with-
out a disclosure document, and (3) in a general solicitation to non-accredited investors without
a disclosure document.  Rule 505 of Regulation D allows the issuer to sell up to $5 million of
its securities in a 12-month period to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35
other persons.  Rule 506 of Regulation D is the only “unlimited” exemption from the Securi-
ties Act, meaning that only under Rule 506 can issuers raise an unlimited amount of money
from issuing unregistered securities.  This makes Rule 506 a popular exemption.
142 Scott Edward Walker, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Convertible Note
Seed Financings (But Were Afraid to Ask), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2012), http://techcrunch
.com/2012/04/07/convertible-note-seed-financings/.
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II. BRIDGEFUNDING
This Article argues that crowdfunding regulations are backwards.
Instead of limiting investment to $1 million per startup,143 crowdfunding
should require startups to raise at least $1 million and up to $5 million
annually.  The Article uses the term “bridgefunding” to describe its new
theory of an inverted crowdfunding regulation.
This Article proposes that bridgefunding may be an effective way to
allow crowds to participate in the private equity market while limiting
fraud and providing a valuable new source of capital for startups.  This
Article’s theory of bridgefunding is based on three main points: (1) star-
tups need capital in the private equity gap of about $1 to $5 million;
(2) crowds are better at making second-period (gap) investment instead
of first-period (seed) investment; and (3) fraud concerns about
crowdfunding can be sufficiently addressed without a $1 million limit.
The policy implications of these observations are a recommendation
for the JOBS Act to invert the $1 million limit for crowdfunding.  Instead
of a ceiling, that should become a floor.  Startups should be required to
raise at least $1 million from crowdfunding, and the ceiling should rise to
at least $5 million.
A. The Bridgefunding Proposal
Bridgefunding means creating a regulatory regime whereby the gen-
eral public can invest in early stage startups.  Early stage startups are
distinguished from seed stage startups in that early stage startups have
already received some seed capital from angels or other professional in-
vestors.144  There are two regulatory mechanisms that can be employed
to ensure that bridgefunding is directed to early stage, not seed stage,
startups.
First, regulators can set a $1 million floor on bridgefunding invest-
ment.  This will do little to harm crowdfunding because crowdfunding is
already far too expensive for sub-million-dollar investment rounds.  As
discussed later in this Part, rational startups will not seek crowdfunding if
they can obtain seed funding from angels, as angel investment is more
efficient.  Angel investment is generally not available for startups that are
very low quality or that need more than $1 million.145  A $1 million floor
bars low quality startups from seeking bridgefunding while allowing
high quality startups to obtain bridgefunding in the more-than-million-
dollar range where angel funding is not readily available.
143 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012).
144 Alternative Investments—The Stages in Venture Capital Investing, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/alternative-investments/venture-capital-
investing-stages.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
145 See FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58. R
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Second, regulators can require that a startup must have at least one
significant, independent stockholder before that startup may raise money
through bridgefunding.  The purpose of this requirement is to bring an
angel or other professional investor into the startup before allowing
crowds to invest.  That professional investor provides diligence and over-
sight while influencing pricing functions that make crowdfunding less
risky and more efficient.
The particular threshold for who qualifies as a “significant investor”
merits further study, but this Article proposes the following framework
predicated on diligence, oversight, and influence.  First, the independent
professional investor must make an investment large enough to compel a
reasonable professional investor to perform thorough due diligence of the
startup.  Due diligence includes tasks like making sure the company is
duly incorporated, confirming that all stock grants have been authorized
by the board, checking the capitalization table for accuracy, considering
the efficacy of the business model, evaluating the competitive landscape,
and determining the viability of the proposed product.
Second, the independent professional investor must acquire rights to
review the startup’s books and records and to attend board meetings.
These oversight rights are commonly found in management rights letters
in venture capital contracts.  Third, the independent professional investor
must own enough stock to influence corporate decision making.  Influ-
ence by minority stockholders is often bargained for in the private equity
contracting process.  Influential rights include protective provisions,
whereby the investor can veto fundamental corporate transactions such
as a liquidation or another stock issuance; rights of first refusal and co-
sale, whereby the investor can effectively prevent the founders from sell-
ing their shares; and board participation rights, whereby the investor is
guaranteed a number of seats on the board of directors.
The professional investor must be independent in order for the dili-
gence, oversight, and influence roles to be meaningfully carried out.  In-
dependence has a different meaning in securities law.  In public
corporations, the requirement for an “independent director” means the
company must have a director on the board who is not a shareholder.146
In the context of bridgefunding, however, the requirement for an “inde-
pendent investor” means an individual who is not related or beholden to
the founders of the startup.  This would disqualify family members and
close friends from playing the role of an independent investor.
While the requirements of a $1 million floor and a prior significant
independent professional investor ensure that bridgefunding is not used
146 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1482
(2007).
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for seedfunding, a $5 million cap on bridgefunding also focuses invest-
ment on early stage startups.  Startups that require substantially more
than $5 million have access to a venture capital investment that can fuel
the startup to reach its later stages.147  Startups of this size do not face a
liquidity crunch, so there does not seem to be any immediate need for
crowds to fund these companies.  Moreover, additional risks of startup
investment emerge in the later stages.  For example, startups may need to
make acquisitions to grow in later stages.  The general public may be in a
poor position to understand whether to funnel money into Startup X so it
can use that capital to purchase Startup Y.  The decentralized nature of
crowds mean they cannot give the same sort of specific advice that ven-
ture capital managers provide to their portfolio companies.  The $5 mil-
lion cap balances the need for startup capital with the need for investor
protection.  Moreover, as discussed in detail below, focusing bridgefund-
ing on the $1 to $5 million range encourages crowds to invest where they
have unique advantages over other participants in the private equity
market.
Bridgefunding can be made more efficient through default provi-
sions in the investment contracts.  Crowds are large heterogeneous
groups of unsophisticated, inexperienced investors.148  They may not
know how to protect their rights through specific provisions in venture
capital contracts.  The law can protect these investors by creating default
or mandatory rules.  These rules can be rigid or flexible.  For example, a
flexible rule about crowdfunding investment agreements may require that
crowds get the same rights that the independent preferred angel investor
received.  It is typical that a later stage investor receives the same or
greater rights than an earlier stage investor does,149 so this regulation
would normalize investment contracts with crowds in the private equity
market.  Crowds might also be protected by rigid default rules.  For ex-
ample, laws may require that crowds receive anti-dilution protections,
rights to veto a sale of company or a later financing round, rights to
inspect books and records, or even the right to have a crowd representa-
tive installed on the board of directors.
In summary, the bridgefunding proposal has four main components:
(1) a $1 million floor to keep low quality startups from obtaining seed
financing from bridgefunding, (2) a $5 million ceiling to prevent crowds
from overinvesting in mature startups, (3) a prior independent profes-
147 See FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58. R
148 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding?  Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1766 (2012).
149 Ibrahim, supra note 54, at 1430–31. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP203.txt unknown Seq: 26 20-APR-16 11:54
422 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:397
sional investor to vet and monitor the startup, and (4) default terms that
make crowdfunding equity contracts more efficient.
B. Why Bridgefunding Works
The pragmatic thrust of this Article is that bridgefunding works,
even though crowdfunding fails.  The remainder of this section reviews
the criticisms of crowdfunding to demonstrate many of the reasons why
bridgefunding can succeed.
1. Bridgefunding Can Fill the Private Equity Gap
The Series A crunch demonstrated that it is getting harder for star-
tups with Series Seed funding to attract Series A investment.150  There’s
a gap between an average of $1 million invested by angels and an aver-
age of $5 million invested by venture funds that relatively few investors
seem willing to fill.151  Even companies like Wittlebee—which received
an unusually large $2.5 million investment in the Series Seed round152—
may require more investment before it is able to demonstrate profitability
and thus secure venture investment.
Crowdfunding could potentially bridge the gap.  But where does
crowdfunding fit in the startup life cycle?  Crowdfunding, as designed by
the JOBS Act, largely aims to take the place of angel investment.
Crowdfunding and angel investment occupy the same space in the startup
ecosystem.153  Both provide small to average Series Seed rounds of
about $1 million.154  Unfortunately, therein lies the problem.  Creating
another source of seed-stage capital around the $1 million mark is not
what the market needs.  The market needs a gap investment that can pro-
vide funding between angel investment and venture investment.
The $1 million dollar investment limit also seems to be inherently
counterintuitive, preventing startups from wanting to use crowdfunding.
Instead of relying on the crowdfunding exemption, startups can rely on
Regulation A+ or Regulation D Rule 506,155 which will be discussed in
depth later.  Those exemptions allow startups to raise at least $50 mil-
lion.156  Regulation D, in particular, might be preferred by startups that
want to avoid extra disclosure liability imposed by the crowdfunding ex-
150 See Grant, supra note 14. R
151 This may be in part because the 100-investor limit prevents angels from forming large
enough syndicates to fund companies through this gap.
152 See Wittlebee, supra note 4. R
153 See Ibrahim, supra note 54, at 1416 (noting that angel investment is usually available R
in smaller amounts than venture capital).
154 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A); see also supra Part I.A.1.
155 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)(2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).
156 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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emption.157  Put simply, crowdfunding has to compete not only with an-
gel investment, but also with other statutory exemptions, both of which
are attractive alternatives to crowdfunding.  If there are superior strate-
gies or better alternatives, crowdfunding simply won’t work.
Crowdfunding needs some sort of competitive advantage in order for it
to be popular, effective, and profitable for investors and startups.
Increasing the maximum amount startups can receive from
crowdfunding would allow crowdfunding to fill a valuable niche.  The
Series A crunch showed that there is a problem with investing between
Series Seed and Series A, creating an opportunity for investors.
Bridgefunding would capitalize on this opportunity and establish the
crowdfunding exemption as an attractive, innovative source of capital.
2. Crowds Are Suited for Bridgefunding
Crowdfunding, as currently regulated, presumes that crowds will be
able to take the place of angels—those investors who find, fund, and
guide nascent startup corporations.158  This Article challenges that as-
sumption and suggests instead that angels are a unique player in the mar-
ket with whom crowds cannot compete.  Angels are often wealthy
market leaders, industry experts, and visionaries.159  They are ideally
suited to help a brand new venture realize its latent potential.  Crowds,
on the other hand, reflect the general wisdom and consensus of the popu-
lation at large.160  Crowds are, by definition, less wealthy than angels,
and the sheer number of crowdfunding investors creates a bell curve dy-
namic where crowds will tend to fund popular companies.
These initial differences show that treating crowdfunding and angel
investment as if they were competitors is ill founded.  Startups require
staged, multi-period investment.161  Angel investment alone is not suffi-
cient to fully grow a startup.162  Crowdfunding alone is equally unlikely
to create a viable, long-term company.163  These groups typically invest
once at the beginning of a startup’s lifecycle, so the startup can grow
large enough to attract venture investment.164  Venture investment, un-
like crowdfunding or angel investment, can sustain a company through-
157 Deborah L. Jacobs, The Trouble with Crowdfunding, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/04/17/the-trouble-with-crowdfunding/.
158 See supra Part I and accompanying text.
159 See FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58. R
160 Tom Kalil & Doug Rand, Crowdfunding: Democratizing Investment for Entrepre-
neurs, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/11/04/crowdfund
ing-democratizing-investment-entrepreneurs.
161 Oranburg, supra note 26. R
162 Id.
163 See Prive, supra note 119 (noting that crowdfunding can help an established business R
expand its product range).
164 See Ibrahim, supra note 54, at 1416–17. R
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out its lifecycle.165  Venture funds have access to hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars.166  Once a venture investor has a vested interest in a
company, the investor may singlehandedly ensure that the startup sur-
vives unprofitable periods.
In order to propel startups through the Series A gap and allow them
to secure this much sought after venture capital, crowdfunding should be
regulated in a way that allows it to operate alongside angel investment,
not in competition with it.  As it stands, the $1 million crowdfunding
limit means crowdfunding and angel investment occupy the same space
in the startup ecosystem—that is, the Series Seed, sub $1 million invest-
ment.167  Data evidencing the Series A crunch has shown that this niche
in the ecosystem is already overcrowded.168  The imposition of a $1 mil-
lion hard cap on investment bars crowds from fulfilling their unique po-
tential and establishes unnecessary competition in a saturated market.
Therefore, criticism that crowdfunding is too limited, expensive, risky,
and complex to be an effective substitute for alternative first-period fi-
nancing for startups is well founded.  It should not be operating as such.
What critics are missing is that crowdfunding—reengineered as
bridgefunding—has the potential to safely inject capital into the second
investment period, when startups need cash desperately and when none
of the current investors is likely to finance post-seed, pre-revenue invest-
ments.  Bridgefunding would allow crowds to immediately step in and
play a valuable role in startup financing.
Crowds have proven their willingness to invest $1 to $5 million or
more in promising early stage projects.  Nomad raised several million
dollars via several campaigns for three novel USB accessories.169  The
Dash raised almost $3.4 million to produce a wireless in-ear headphone
and fitness tracker.170  Pono Music (founded by Neil Young) raised al-
most $6.3 million to create a high fidelity portable music player.171
165 Id. at 1411–12.
166 See  NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35. R
167 See Ibrahim, supra note 54, at 1416; 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012); see also supra R
Part I.A.1.
168 See, e.g., Grant, supra note 14. R
169 Erin Hobey, Crowdfunding on CircleUp, Nomad Connects with Fluxmob: Grows
Smartphone Accessory Brand to over $2 Million in Sales, CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 14,
2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/07/44021-crowdfunding-circleup-nomad-con-
nects-fluxmob-grows-smartphone-accessory-brand-2-million-sales/.
170 The Dash—Wireless Smart In Ear Headphones, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kick-
starter.com/projects/hellobragi/the-dash-wireless-smart-in-ear-headphones (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).
171 Pono Music—Where Your Soul Rediscovers Music, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kick-
starter.com/projects/1003614822/ponomusic-where-your-soul-rediscovers-music (last visited
Jan. 17, 2015).
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OUYA raised $8.5 million to create an open source video game console
that is powered by Android OS and plays on a television.172
3. Bridgefunding Addresses Fraud
Crowdfunding, understandably, raises concerns about investor pro-
tections.  Scholars such as Professor Thomas Lee Hazen caution, “[i]f
history teaches us anything, the lesson is that social media technologies
increase rather than decrease the potential for fraud.”173  I disagree with
the premise that social media enhances fraud—in other works I argue
that Twitter and other social media enhance collective shareholder activ-
ism.174  Rather, it seems that fraud concerns are overblown, and those
concerns can be diminished when crowdfunding is used as gap financing.
The concerns underlying claims for more antifraud regulations are out of
touch with how crowdfunding and startup investment actually work.  For
example, Professor Hazen writes:
The Internet and social networking offer fertile ground
for scammers.  Scammers and securities fraudsters have
for nearly a century found ways to adapt their scams to
new technologies.  Consider, for example, high-pressure
boiler room sales operations or the promotion of ficti-
tious or worthless securities to build Ponzi schemes.
The Internet has also proven to be fertile ground for
pump and dump schemes.  Boiler room tactics have
adapted to new technologies.  For example, telephonic
cold calling has been supplemented or superseded by
spam emails.175
None of these concerns has anything to do with social media.  In
fact, the most recent case cited in support of “pump and dump opera-
tions” was resolved in 2006—when social media barely existed.  Fast
forward to 2013, when spam emails (like phishing scams) are actually
declining.176  Other crowdfunding securities can be advertised online, but
there are scant reports of spam scams from LendingClub, Prosper,
RealtyMogul, or any other debt crowdfunding portals.177  If anything,
172 OUYA: A New Kind of Video Game Console, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter
.com/projects/ouya/ouya-a-new-kind-of-video-game-console?ref=sidebar (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).
173 Hazen, supra note 148, at 1769. R
174 Seth C. Oranburg, A Little Birdie Said: How Twitter Is Disrupting Shareholder Activ-
ism, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 695, 695 (2015).
175 Hazen, supra note 148, at 1767–68 (citations omitted). R
176 Victoria Lund-Funkhouser, Top 7 Phishing Scams of 2013, RETURN PATH (Dec. 26,
2013), http://blog.returnpath.com/blog/tori-funkhouser/top-7-phishing-scams-of-2013.
177 See, e.g., LendingClub Corporation, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/
greater-san-francisco/business-reviews/financial-services/lendingclub-corporation-in-san-fran-
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social media makes crowdfunding safer.  Investors can share informa-
tion, form groups, build trust, and establish rapport despite geographic
boundaries, all thanks to social media.178  Crowdfunding happens in-
stantly online, making transactions transparent.  Monitoring is easy and
information flows freely.  Ordinary Americans are savvy to online
scams.179
Other articles state that “the risk for fraud against such well-inten-
tioned people and their potential backers is very real,”180 but why is this
fraud more worrisome than other investment risks?  Public Citizen, a
D.C. think tank, uses similar rhetoric: “[T]he public will be outraged
if . . . Congress approves legislation that further deregulates Wall Street
and facilitates more financial fraud.  The House should reject H.R.
3606.”181  Putting aside the fact that crowdfunding has almost nothing to
do with Wall Street—this is more of a Silicon Valley kind of regula-
tion—more claims of fraud with no specificity should be understood as
sound and fury, signifying nothing.
The truth is, crowdfunding is not more prone to fraud than other
forms of investment.  Merely being on the Internet does not make it
worse.  Social media does not hurt investors; it helps them collaborate.
But Congress watered down Regulation Crowdfunding—perhaps to en-
sure that the JOBS Act would quickly pass182—in response to antifraud
(and, bizarrely, anti-Wall Street) rhetoric.  The result is a regulation that
is too complicated and expensive to be useful.
Merely because something takes place on the Internet does not
make it per se more fraudulent.  For instance, the Internet prevents fraud
by giving investors the ability to instantly discuss concerns with each
other.  But some fraud concerns are actually supported by real-world in-
stances, which can happen online or offline, like pump-and-dump
schemes.  And even without fraud, startup investment is very risky.  But
the literature seems to overlook a very powerful antifraud device built
cisco-ca-361746 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (giving LendingClub an A+ rating, but noting that
the company’s name has been used in an online lending scam).
178 Oranburg, supra note 174, at 707. R
179 See, e.g., OH Attorney General: Watch Out for These Scams in 2015, CINCINNATI.COM
(Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/01/10/oh-attorney-general-watch-
scams/21582267/ (noting Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine’s advice on how not to fall for
internet scams).
180 Jacques F. Baritot, Increasing Protection for Crowdfunding Investors Under the JOBS
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259, 281 (2013) (concluding that “the risk for fraud against
[unsophisticated investors]” is very real, without providing any examples or support).
181 Vote NO on JOBS Act, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/documents/vote-no-
on-jobs-act.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
182 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment
Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that
Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865 (2014) (explaining how fear of crowdfunding
combined with the political necessity to vote for the JOBS Act led to a watered down rule).
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into Regulation Crowdfunding: personal liability of the founder and
other parties related to the issuer for fraud.  Moreover, bridgefunding
happens after seedfunding, when angels invest.  Angels provide a front
line of defense against fraud that crowdfunders can enjoy.
Regulation Crowdfunding imposes personal liability on the foun-
ders and other parties related to the issuer.  These additional liabilities
make crowdfunding even more costly and less attractive.  Alternative
fundraising modalities, like Regulation D, are subject to fewer causes of
action for fraud.  These additional fraud liabilities should, however, quell
the fraud concerns discussed above.
All securities issuances are subject to fraud liability under § 17 of
the Securities Act, which makes it unlawful to conduct fraudulent inter-
state securities transactions,183 and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act,
which imposes liability for “any untrue statement of a material fact or
[omission of] a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made.”184  In addition, Regulation Crowdfunding imposes liability on is-
suers for omission of “a material fact required to be stated,” even if that
fact is not necessary in order to make the statement made.185
Regulation Crowdfunding also imposes liability on “any person
who is a director or partner of the issuer, and the principal executive
officer or officers, principal financial officer, and controller or principal
accounting officer of the issuer (and any person occupying a similar sta-
tus or performing a similar function).”186  To win an award of damages
from fraud under Regulation Crowdfunding, plaintiffs do not have to
prove that the defendant’s fraud caused the plaintiff’s loss,187 nor must
plaintiffs prove that defendants acted willfully.188
The triple threat of personal liability for the executive officers, a
lower standard for proving fraud and a broader definition of fraud by
omission, greatly increases the liability of issuers who use Regulation
Crowdfunding vis-a`-vis those who use Regulation D.  All else being
equal, issuers will prefer to sell stock under another exemption (such as
Regulation D) that imposes less liability on the company and its agents.
This added antifraud protection helps Regulation Crowdfunding discour-
age fraudulent issuers from using crowdfunding.
Moreover, it is much easier to set up a nascent shell corporation
than it is to operate a company for a year, obtain angel seedfunding in-
vestment, and develop a product (not just a promise).  Due to the costs of
183 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
184 Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
185 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A).
186 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(3).
187 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(1)(B).
188 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(B).
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committing such fraud on bridgefunding investors—who are not the first
investors in a company—it seems unlikely that bridgefunding would be
used for naked fraud in a way that seedfunding scams could exist.
However, there are simple regulatory solutions that could quell
whatever marginal fraud concerns arise from allowing a startup to raise
$5 million instead of $1 million.  For example, Regulation Crowdfunding
already limits investors to 10% of their annual income or net worth to
invest in crowdfunding each year.  This could simply be extended to
limit any particular investor to investing 10% of his or her annual income
or net worth in any particular startup.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that if a scammer wants to steal
$5 million via crowdfunding, he can do so under Regulation Crowdfund-
ing as it is currently drafted almost as easily as if the limit were higher.
The scammer could simply set up five separate pseudo-startups.  There is
nothing in the law, nor any rules, which prohibit such a parallel offering.
Simply put, the $1 million limit does not protect investors, and it pre-
vents good companies from genuinely benefitting from crowdfunding.
4. Bridgefunding Addresses Cost
Scholars such as Professor C. Steven Bradford189 recognize that
“[t]o be useful to small business issuers, a crowdfunding exemption
needs to be relatively simple and inexpensive.”190  To qualify for the
exemption, startups and portals must strictly comply with all the require-
ments of Regulation Crowdfunding—there is no “substantial compli-
ance” rule as is found in other securities exemptions.191  Regulation
Crowdfunding requires startups to file with the SEC and make available
to the public disclosures about the company’s financial information,
ownership, capital structure, business plan, and risk factors.192  Comply-
ing with these complex regulations requires startups to retain the services
of lawyers and accountants, thus adding cost through complexity.193
Portals must register with the SEC as a broker or a “funding por-
tal.”194  Registering as a funding portal is expensive, and portals can be
disqualified in several ways:
189 Earl Dunlap Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln College
of Law.
190 C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled,
40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012).
191 See id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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The term “funding portal” means any person acting as an
intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale
of securities for the account of others . . . that does not—
(A) offer investment advice or recommendations;
(B) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securi-
ties offered or displayed on its website or portal;
(C) compensate employees, agents, or other persons for
such solicitation or based on the sale of securities dis-
played or referenced on its website or portal;
(D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor
funds or securities; or
(E) engage in such other activities as the Commission,
by rule, determines appropriate.195
Strict compliance with Regulation Crowdfunding is difficult, and
any noncompliance by a crowdfunding issuer can disqualify its portal
from making any crowdfunding offerings.196  This is problematic be-
cause crowdfunding needs a crowd to congregate on a portal and make
crowdsourced decisions.  The high risk of total, across-the-board portal
disqualification for minor, technical noncompliance by an issuer on that
portal makes becoming a portal less attractive.  And, as if being a portal
were not disfavored enough, the JOBS Act also forbids portals from
compensating its employees or agents based on sales.  This seems to dis-
advantage portals vis-a`-vis registered brokers, who are not subject to this
restriction.197  Portals will have to pass these costs to crowdfunding
issuers.
Startups can raise only $1 million pursuant to Regulation
Crowdfunding, and doing so costs up to $151,660.198  As discussed ear-
lier, using Regulation D costs about $25,000,199 and in 2014 angel inves-
tors invested $24.1 billion, with an average deal size of $328,300.200
About 70,000 startups obtain initial angel investment annually.
Crowdfunding is so expensive that its investors are likely to be privy
only to the 70,001st best startup that year.  That is why many commenta-
tors have thrown in the towel and declared that crowdfunding will fail.
One of the primary purposes of bridgefunding is to avoid this unfor-
tunate result.  Recall that the costs associated with crowdfunding are
195 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012).
196 See Bradford, supra note 190. R
197 Id.
198 Neiss, supra note 22. R
199 See Series Seed—Term Sheet, SERIES SEED, www.seriesseed.com (last visited Feb. 22,
2015) (describing that the standard form of Series Seed Term Sheet specifies that a company
will reimburse purchaser’s counsel with a flat fee of $10,000).  It is generally understood that
the company’s counsel usually bills about 1.5 times what a purchaser’s counsel does.
200 Sohl, supra note 20. R
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mostly fixed costs; they do not increase very much as the amount of
money raised increases.  As a result, the cost per dollar raised decreases
when a startup raises $5 million instead of $1 million.  Somewhere in the
range of $3 to $5 million, bridgefunding becomes about as expensive—
on a per-dollar-raised basis—as raising money from angel investors.
This solves much of the cost issue.
The issue of complication is directly tied in with the cost.  Compli-
cation is something that can be dealt with given sufficient resources.
Startups can hire lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to resolve
some of the JOBS Act’s complicated requirements if the startup raises
enough money to pay the associated fees, with enough money left over to
actually operate.
5. Bridgefunding Addresses Business Risk
Startup investment is risky business, but crowdfunding may attract
the riskiest startups.  Scholars such as Professor Michael B. Dorff argue
that “[t]he problem [with crowdfunding] is that the companies that par-
ticipate will be terrible prospects . . . . [S]tart-ups with real potential will
continue to use other programs . . . .”201  He then raises concerns that
series seed angel investments may be unprofitable,202 which may also be
true about venture capital funds for certain periods.203  I am concerned
that crowdfunding is even worse than angel investment in this regard, but
do not doubt the necessity of series seedfunding for startups to continue
innovating.  Nevertheless, Professor Dorff and I arrive at virtually the
same conclusion: “The most promising companies—that small percent-
age of start-up companies that account for the bulk of angel investors’
gains—will seek their financing far from the costly crowd.”204  That is
the extent of our agreement, however.  I do not agree that “the SEC’s
best option is to kill retail crowdfunding with excessive regulation.”205
Instead, regulators should revive crowdfunding through the concept of
bridgefunding so it will attract some of the best companies.
Professor Darian M. Ibrahim argues that crowdfunding might actu-
ally attract some high-quality entrepreneurs and investors.206  “First, Ti-
tle III should appeal to high-quality startups that are too young for
201 Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 492,
492 (2014).
202 Id. at 509–20.
203 See Robert S. Harris, et al., Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?, 69 J.
Fin. 1851 (2014) (studying the performance of nearly 1,400 buyout and venture capital funds
and concluding that such funds performed below the S&P 500 average in the 2000s).
204 Dorff, supra note 201, at 519. R
205 Id. at 522.
206 See Darian M., Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons? 100 MINN. L.
REV. 561, 604 (2015).
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‘professional’ financing . . . . Second, . . . Title III would appeal to that
subset of startups that need cash but do not need value-added services
from investors.”207  I disagree with both possibilities.  Title III cannot
possibly appeal to “startups [that] are too early stage for even a $100,000
angel investment to be on the table”208 because complying with regula-
tions could cost more than the startup would raise.  Raising $100,000
through crowdfunding could cost $39,000, most of which are fixed costs
that do not drop much as the amount raised decreases.209  And while I
agree that startups who need money—but not services—could prefer
crowdfunding over venture capital, that argument assumes incorrectly
that crowdfunding is cheaper than venture capital and that crowdfunding
and venture capital fundraising overlap.  Crowdfunding simply is not a
substitute for venture capital, although it could become a good alterna-
tive to venture capital if the crowdfunding limit were raised to at least
$5 million, a solution this Article proposes.
6. Bridgefunding Addresses Price Uncertainty
How does the general public determine what a brand new startup
security is worth?  How do investors know whether startup securities are
being sold for the right price?  Professor Alan Palmiter210 pinpoints a
critical non-fraud problem in crowdfunding.211  His recent paper, Pricing
Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious Conundrum, asks: How do inexpe-
rienced, small, casual investors know they are buying startup securities
for the “right” price?212  Professor Palmiter suggests that startups should
be responsible for proposing the price and methodology behind that pro-
posal.213  Professor Palmiter also recognizes that the SEC cannot police
every tiny offering, so he proposes a new self-help scheme for defrauded
crowdfunding investors.214
The failure of a crowdfunding issuer to disclose clear assumptions
underlying the chosen method for determining the price of offered secur-
ities would be materially false and misleading.215  But enforcing the an-
tifraud Rule 10b-5 requires either public or private action.216  The
plaintiff’s recovery in a private enforcement action against a crowdfund-
ing issuer pursuant to Rule 10b-5 for failure to disclose pricing method-
207 Id. at 589–90.
208 Id. at 589.
209 See Neiss, supra note 22. R
210 Howard L. Oleck Professor of Business Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
211 See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious Conun-
drum, 7 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 373 (2012).
212 See id. at 374.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 375.
215 See id. at 415.
216 See id. at 418.
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ology is limited to the amount invested, so damage awards can be at most
$1 million.217  Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, which are on average between
twenty and thirty percent of the settlement amount,218 would be too small
to justify commencing the action.219
Will the public authorities step in where it is economically unfeasi-
ble for private lawyers to take action?  The SEC prioritizes its limited
resources for enforcement action based on “(1) the message delivered to
the industry and public; (2) the amount of investors harm done; (3) the
deterrent value of the action; and (4) the SEC’s visibility in certain areas
. . . .”
220
 The SEC’s investigations department very rarely refers Regula-
tion D violations (which reflect greater harm from a more frequent and
visible type of transaction than crowdfunding) to the SEC’s enforcement
division, so it is highly unlikely that the SEC will prosecute crowdfund-
ing violations.221  Arbitration could be a faster and cheaper alternative to
public or private action for the policing of 10b-5 (fraud) violations in
crowdfunding disclosures.222  But the JOBS Act currently lacks any
mandate for arbitration, so issuers do not have to agree to arbitrate
claims.223  Arbitration is also problematic because arbiters are not re-
quired to produce any written explanation behind their award of dam-
ages.224  Arbitration decisions in securities law also have no precedential
value.225
Professor Palmiter presents a novel alternative in both public and
private litigation and arbitration.  Price insurance would be a new way to
ensure that crowdfunding investors are not bamboozled.226  The insur-
217 See id. at 416.
218 See id. at 417–18 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Liti-
gation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
889–90 (1987)); see also Frequently Asked Questions About Class Actions, BERNSTEIN
LIEBHARD LLP, http://www.bernlieb.com/FAQs/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
219 Palmiter, supra note 211, at 417. R
220 Id. at 418–19 (citing James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 751 (2003) (explaining that SEC enforcement is used as a beacon
showing what the SEC considers important to preserving financial market integrity)).
221 See id. at 420 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
REGULATION D EXEMPTION PROCESS 13, 18–20 (2009) (explaining that, despite discovering
multiple violations in a sample of forty-one Regulation D filings, in the fifteen-month period
ending in December 2008, the Division of Corporate Finance’s Office of Small Business Pol-
icy only referred one Regulation D issue to the Enforcement division).
222 See id. at 422–21.
223 See id. at 422.
224 See id. at 424.
225 See id. at 425 (citing Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along:
The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1001 (2002)) (pointing
out that because most cases are now heard by an arbitration panel, as opposed to a judge or
jury, law in the field has matured only slightly since Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987)).
226 See Palmiter, supra note 211, at 426. R
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ance provider would be incentivized to investigate startups issuing
crowdfunding securities on behalf of all the small investors, thus solving
a collective action problem where no small investors find it worth their
while to thoroughly investigate risks.227  Fortunately, the concern of mis-
pricing is diminished when a startup has operated for a period of time
and has completed at least one priced equity fundraising round from an-
gel investors.  Raising the crowdfunding limit thus alleviates some pric-
ing uncertainty.
Moreover, bridgefunding requires prior equity investment by pro-
fessional angel investors.  That means a priced round of stock has been
sold.  Stock reflects a percentage ownership of a company.228  For exam-
ple, someone who owns 1 million out of 10 million shares owns 10% of
StartX.  How much he or she paid for that percentage of shares translates
into an objective valuation of StartX.  If she paid $1 million to end up
with 10% of StartX, the enterprise as a whole is worth $10 million.  Val-
uation is inherent in a priced round of stock.
In contrast to a priced round, startups can sell convertible securities.
There are several types of convertible securities.  A common type is con-
vertible debt.  These are loans which can automatically convert the prin-
cipal owed (and sometimes the interest accrued) into an amount of stock
based on a per-share stock value.  The amount of stock can be fixed at
the time the convertible debt is issued.  More commonly, however, the
stock value is determined when the next financing occurs.  Debt holders
often get a discount at that time.229  For example, StartX sells $1 million
of convertible debt to Angela.  The debt agreement provides for a 1%
simple annual interest.  Angela’s debt converts to preferred stock when-
ever the next investor buys Series Seed preferred stock of StartX, say for
$1 per share.  Angela bargained for a discount of 80% of the per share
price of the next investor.  At the closing of the preferred stock sale,
Angela’s debt automatically converts into 1,262,500 shares of StartX
preferred stock.
Convertible securities—which also come in more exotic flavors like
a “simple agreement for future equity” and “convertible equity”—defer
the valuation of a startup until the next financing.230  Such transactions
are not useful in valuing bridgefunding stock.  That is why such transac-
227 See id.
228 See Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stock.asp (last visited
Oct. 8, 2015).
229 Peter Werner, Primer on Convertible Debt, COOLEY LLP, https://www.cooleygo.com/
convertible-debt/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
230 Melody Peng, Using Convertible Equity: What Startups Need to Know, LIGHTER CAPI-
TAL (May 1, 2015), https://www.lightercapital.com/blog/using-convertible-equity-what-start
ups-need-to-know/.
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tions do not qualify as a prior independent professional investment as
described in Part II.A above.
7. Bridgefunding Opens New Business Models
As demonstrated above, VCs primarily invest in high-tech compa-
nies and secondarily in life science companies.231  Bridgefunding creates
a new source of funding that may inspire entrepreneurs to build alterna-
tive business models.  Furthermore, the data show that VCs strongly pre-
fer to invest in local startups.232  That means, for many entrepreneurs,
moving to Silicon Valley.  The Bay Area is one of the most expensive
places in the world to live, and the attraction of venture capital there
continues to draw residents and increase prices.  Other regions have at-
tempted to create their own, local “Silicon Valley,” but they have been
met with limited success.233
Venture capital firms prefer to invest in high technology.  Software
firms are especially popular targets for VC investment.  Intellectual prop-
erty is highly scalable.  Once good code is developed—whether an
iPhone application, an encryption algorithm, or database management
tools—spending money on marketing can have a direct effect on making
lucrative sales.234  Some readers may recall when Internet advertising
was the business model of most startups.  Now many startups rely on in-
app purchases.
Software is clearly important, but it is not the only innovation we
need.  Life sciences, biotechnology, and apparel are left out of the
mix.235  It gets worse than that.  Women are disadvantaged when seeking
venture capital.236  Individuals located outside of Silicon Valley are over-
231 See supra Part I.
232 See Merrill F. Hoopengardner, Nontraditional Venture Capital: An Economic Devel-
opment Strategy for Alaska, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 357, 368 (2003) (“Thus, in addition to eco-
nomic considerations, the hand-holding nature of the venture capital business is compromised
if the venture capital firm is geographically removed from the business in which it is
investing.”).
233 Vivek Wadhwa, Silicon Valley Can’t Be Copied, MIT TECH. REV. (July 3, 2013),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/516506/silicon-valley-cant-be-copied/.
234 Dragana Mendel, Is Your Startup a High Growth Venture Capital Type? (Feb. 2,
2015), http://www.anagard.com/blog/2015/02/02/is-your-startup-a-high-growth-venture-capi-
tal-type/.
235 See Bruce Booth, Debunking Myths About Biotech Venture Capital, FORBES (May 22,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebooth/2013/05/22/debunking-myths-about-biotech-
venture-capital/.
236 See Tom Kaneshige, Why Venture Capitalists Don’t Fund Women-Led Startups, CIO
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.cio.com/article/2882826/venture-capital/why-venture-capitalists-
dont-fund-women-led-startups.html.  Tom Kaneshige  from CIO argues that there seems to be
two main reasons why female-led startups struggle to secure venture capital.  First, venture
firms like to invest in leaders, not just great ideas.  As it presently stands, almost all venture
managing partners are men, and they seem to be more comfortable investing in startups led by
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looked or ignored.237  Startup investment’s diversity problem is so pro-
nounced that Mirror Digital’s CEO, Sheila Marmon, launched the
Venture Capital Access Program to help women and minority-led busi-
nesses to raise capital.238
Bridgefunding can democratize startup investment.  Whereas today
the preferences of venture capital firms dictate how angels invest and
which startups succeed, in the future, a crowdsourced approach to equity
financing may allow the general public to pick the next Facebook.
III. WHY CURRENT REGULATIONS FAIL
Bridgefunding is supported and informed by theories in the litera-
tures of business innovation, law, and economics.  This Part addresses
and incorporates those into the literature regarding securities law, while
explaining why existing regulations are insufficient to bridge the private
equity gap.
A. Law and Economics of the Private Equity Gap
The Series A gap appears to be a failure in the private equity mar-
ket, but economic theory suggests that well-functioning markets should
not suffer failures in equilibrium.239  Ascribing to this theory leads to
three possible conclusions.  The first possible conclusion is that the gap
is not a market failure, but an artifact of a well-functioning market.  Per-
haps the gap simply reflects that an increasing quantity of untenable star-
tups were founded this decade.  This Article cannot explore a
counterfactual world, where all failed startups actually received funding,
and measure the performance of that private equity market against the
real world.  But this Article does present evidence that startups failed
largely and without any correlation to their long term potential for suc-
cess.  Wittlebee—as mentioned earlier—failed to get funding, was sold
to another company in a fire sale liquidation (where investors got pennies
on the dollar for their investment), and went on to thrive as a subsidiary
of its new parent organization.240  These facts, at least, sew reasonable
doubt that the gap is desirable.
male entrepreneurs.  Second, and interrelated, there is a dearth of women venture capitalists
generally, and they are often negatively stereotyped by their male counterparts in the industry.
237 Alicia Purdy & Kaja Kwasneiewska, The Fine Print on Investing in Venture Capital,
FIN. POISE (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.financialpoise.com/accreditedinvestormarkets/print/
3018/ (noting that angels and VC funds normally “will not invest in companies outside their
geographic area (usually 100–150 miles from the VC’s office)”).
238 David Teten, Helping Women and Minorities Raise Angel Capital, DAVID TETEN,
http://teten.com/blog/2014/04/18/helping-women-and-minorities-raise-angel-capital/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2015).
239 See JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 24–26 (5th ed. 2009).
240 See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
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The second possible conclusion is that the private equity market is
not in equilibrium, but is responding to some sort of shock.241  Perhaps a
crash in public stock markets temporarily changed investor behavior in
the private equity market.  If the gap exists only in disequilibrium, it will
go away when the shock has finished rippling through the market.  Only
time will tell if the gap exists in disequilibrium or is persistent, but data
show that the gap has existed, and has been expanding, since at least
2011.242  The expansion of the gap for four years appears to be prima
facie evidence that it is not merely a disequilibrium state.
The third possible conclusion is that the gap is the result of a market
failure, which can possibly be addressed by law.  This Article argues that
there is good evidence of market failure in the private equity market.
1. Economic Theory Explains the Gap
It is not the aim of this Article to prove that there is a market failure
in the private equity market through economic modeling.  Rather, the
intention is to show that there are several reasonable bases for conclud-
ing that the gap is not merely a positive market characteristic or a tempo-
rary glitch.
Market failure can result from a number of situations, including reg-
ulations, monopoly power, transaction costs, lack of information, and ir-
rational actors.  Some of these situations can be quickly ruled out.  For
example, there is no evidence of any monopoly or even market power in
the private equity market.  Rather, the private equity market has tens of
thousands of participants.  The largest participant, NEA, which raised $3
billion, reflects only 0.5% of the cumulative amounts that VC funds have
raised since 1985 and only 1.5% of the money under management by VC
funds in 2013.243
It also appears unlikely that the gap is the result of irrational actors.
While it is true that angel investors often speak of caring about more than
money and giving back to the start-up community, in general these inves-
tors are sophisticated professionals who are looking to make a profit.244
Some might claim that venture fund managers make decisions that bene-
fit the managers to the detriment of the fund.  That may occur at the
margins, but fund managers have to raise money from investors every
seven to ten years.245  VC managers simply cannot expect to usurp fund
opportunities or profit themselves at the expense of the fund and con-
tinue to be able to raise money.
241 PERLOFF, supra note 239, at 24–31. R
242 See Kramer & Levine, supra note 97. R
243 Primack, supra note 67. R
244 FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58.
245 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35. R
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Transaction costs in the private equity market are higher than in
public stock markets, and this factor does, in fact, seem to have affected
behavior in the private equity market.  Raising money by selling stock
costs at least $25,000 in legal fees.246  Therefore, it would be irrational to
raise less than $25,000 by selling stock in all instances.  Transaction
costs increase as the amount raised increases, so larger transactions tend
to have lower transaction costs on a per-dollar-raised basis than smaller
transactions.  This may be one reason why angels invest in groups.  An-
gel groups share transaction costs among all the investors, so each inves-
tor can contribute a small amount, yet the aggregate amount contributed
is enough to outweigh the transaction costs.  Transaction costs become
less of a factor in VC transactions.  Spending $100,000 in legal fees to
secure an investment of $10,000,000 is well within the range of transac-
tion costs that allow proper market functioning.  Moreover, if angels
wish to invest in startups without purchasing equity, they can make simi-
lar investments with convertible notes,247 simple agreements for future
equity,248 or other instruments that require spending only a few thousand
dollars in transaction costs.
While there does not seem to be any obvious externalities in the
private equity market, the group dynamics of angel investment may
prove otherwise.  An externality is a cost or benefit imposed on individu-
als not participating in the trade.249  It seems, at first, that only the startup
and the investor gain or lose from the purchase of equity.  However, it is
critical to remember that startup investment is a multi-period strategy.250
In order for a first-period (seed) investment to pay off, someone else
must make a second-period investment as well.  In fact, many startups
require several stages of funding before that startup can be profitably
sold in a merger event or made liquid through an initial public offer-
ing.251  In the private equity market, an angel in the first period enjoys a
positive externality when a different investor invests in the company in
the second period.
Angels invest in groups, but the entire group does not need to rein-
vest in order for the startup to survive.  If an angel joins a group that
makes a startup investment, the group as a whole may want to reinvest in
that startup to prevent it from failing, but an individual angel in the group
may prefer to let the rest of the group save the startup.  This is called a
246 See supra note 199. R
247 Are Safe Investment Docs Safer than Convertible Notes?, START UP LAW PROF. BLOG
(July 8, 2014), https://startuplawprof.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/are-safe-investment-docs-
safer-than-convertible-notes/.
248 Id.
249 See PERLOFF, supra note 239, at 605–07. R
250 See supra Part I.A.2.
251 See supra Part I.A.
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hold-out problem, which can lead to angel underinvestment in the private
equity market.252
Angels can also seek a positive externality by free riding on another
investor’s efforts.253  Diligence, also called due diligence, is the process
by which an investor and his counsel review a potential investment.254
This involves obtaining stage agency filings to ensure that the company
was properly created and is up to date on its tax payments.  This con-
firms that no creditors have a lien on the company or its assets, verifying
that the capitalization table accurately reflects who owns how much of
the startup.  In turn, this ensures that the startup actually owns its intel-
lectual property, checking whether the startup’s board of directors prop-
erly authorized any corporate actions, reviewing the financial statements,
investigating the history of the founders and the key employees, assess-
ing the business risks of the startup, and evaluating the competitive land-
scape for that business model.255  Then the angel has to negotiate the
terms of the preferred stock purchase agreement, review the documents
to ensure they comply with the terms, execute a wire transfer, and ensure
that the stock certificate has been received and stored.  In addition, an
angel may continue to oversee the startup after the investment is consum-
mated by sitting on the board of directors, reviewing financial informa-
tion, advising the leadership team, or physically inspecting the prototype
or product.256
Angels can avoid these costs by following a “lead” angel.  A lead
angel is a member of an angel group who bears the costs of the diligence,
negotiations, and oversight.  Recall that angel groups can be organized or
ad hoc.  Organized angel groups such as the Hyde Park Angels may have
a formal process by which members alternate responsibility for diligence
tasks and get reimbursed by the group for associated fees.  Ad hoc angel
groups, on the other hand, may be formed solely for the purpose of mak-
ing a single investment.  In such groups, angels prefer to avoid the costs
associated with diligence by allowing another to bear those costs, then
interpreting that other investor’s willingness to invest as a signal that the
diligence turned out favorably.  In this way, an angel can derive a posi-
tive externality by free riding on another’s efforts.
Angel free riding problems can be formalized in a game called the
prisoner’s dilemma.257  In this game, two co-conspirators who cannot
252 See Oranburg, supra note 26. R
253 Id.
254 Due Diligence, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/duediligence.asp
(last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
255 See The Due Diligence Process in Venture Capital (VC), MARS (Dec. 6, 2013), http://
www.marsdd.com/mars-library/the-due-diligence-process-in-venture-capital/.
256 See Ibrahim, supra note 54, at 1432–33. R
257 See PERLOFF, supra note 239, at 481–82. R
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communicate are charged with arson and murder, for which there is evi-
dence for arson, but not murder.  A confession by either conspirator,
however, would be sufficient for a murder conviction.  The prosecutor
offers the following plea bargain: If neither confesses, both will serve
two years in prison for arson.  If one confesses and the other does not,
the confessor will walk free and the other will serve ten years for murder.
If they both confess, they will both be charged with murder but receive a
lesser sentence of six years for their cooperation.  The best outcome for
both is that both remain silent (resulting in a total sentence of four years),
but they cannot communicate and agree to be silent.258  Accordingly,
both will confess, resulting in a total sentence of twelve years.  This is a
sub-optimal outcome.
The prisoner’s dilemma applies to angel investment in the following
way.  Two angels want to invest in the same startup, but they are not
aware of each other’s existence, so they cannot communicate.  There is a
lack of information in the market about other investors’ interest in a star-
tup.  Each angel will decide to undergo the cost of diligence, similar to
how both conspirators decided to confess, even though this is a sub-opti-
mal outcome for the angels.  Accordingly, angel investment costs more
than it would in an optimal environment, so certain angel investments
that are socially desirable do not get made.  This result, again, is
underinvestment.
Yet another reason for a failure in the startup private equity market
is regulation, which leads to a lack of liquidity.  As mentioned earlier, the
Securities Act of 1933 requires that only accredited investors make angel
investments and only qualified purchasers make venture capital invest-
ments.259  In other words, regulations limit who may participate in the
private equity market.  Regulations also impose various disclosure re-
quirements and fraud liabilities on market participants.  The effect is to
shrink the pool of entities for whom it is possible and economically ra-
tional to participate in this market.  Regulations can therefore lead to a
liquidity crunch.
It may seem that there is endless capital in the private equity mar-
ket.  But in context, it becomes apparent that capital is somewhat limited.
In 2013, angels and VC firms together invested almost $55 billion.260
258 See id.
259 The term “accredited investor” is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).  The term “quali-
fied purchaser” mirrors the accredited investor term.  Defining the Term “Qualified Purchaser”
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839 (Dec. 27, 2001) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 230).
260 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35; Sohl, supra note 20.  VCs invested R
much more—$49.1 billion—in 2014, but seems to be an outlier, especially since 85% of those
investments were follow-on investments. See  NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, R
at 56 fig.3.19.
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This is roughly equal to the amount of investment in initial public offer-
ings that year,261 and about the same amount that gold mining corpora-
tions invested on projects and acquisitions in 2010.262  In contrast,
shareholders in public stock markets received $1,167 billion of income in
dividends alone in 2014.263
This section has taken a law and economics approach to the ques-
tion of why there is a Series A gap and a Series A crunch.  The next
section will attempt to explain the gap based on market fundamentals.
There are two dynamics that drive the Series A gap to become wider and
taller, thus creating a larger gap, which leads to more companies failing
in the Series A crunch.  The first dynamic, which makes the gap wider, is
inherent in the nature of successful venture firms making larger invest-
ments.  The second dynamic, which makes the gap taller, results from
new technology that allows more angels to better diversify by making
more small investments.  The wider gap is harder to cross and extends
the range of startups whose business models are unfundable even though
they may otherwise be ultimately profitable.
2. Venture Capital Success Widens the Gap
As venture firms succeed, they receive more money under manage-
ment, so they need to either make more investments or larger invest-
ments.  Making venture capital investments is costly—venture firms
spend significant resources considering a potential investment, venture
financing involves a lot of legal costs, and firms provide many value-
added services to their portfolio companies—but those costs do not in-
crease much as the amount invested increases.264  In other words, venture
capital investments have economies of scale.265
Data support this claim.  The average venture capital investment in
early stage startup financing has increased steadily (except for a huge
increase during the dot-com bubble)266 from $1.76 million in 1985 to
$7.32 million in 2014.
261 Ben Rooney, Stocks: 2013 Is One for the Record Books, CNN MONEY (Dec. 31,
2013), http://buzz.money.cnn.com/2013/12/31/stocks-record-bull-market/ (noting that 222
companies went public in 2013, raising nearly $55 billion).
262 Nathan Vardi, How Gold Miners Became A Terrible Investment, FORBES (July 1,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/07/01/how-gold-miners-became-a-terri-
ble-investment-2/ (determining that gold mining operations invested $60 billion in 2010).
263 Global Dividend Income Hits New Record of $1.167 Trillion, BBC NEWS (Feb. 16,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31485930.
264 See PERLOFF, supra note 239, at 208. R
265 Id.
266 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1865 (2013) (explaining venture capital investment during the peak
of the dot-com bubble in 2000).
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Figure 7: While the number of VC early-stage deals has increased, the amount invested
per early-stage VC deal has also increased.267
From the third quarter of 2013 to the second quarter of 2014, venture
capital investment increased from $12 to $22 billion,268 while the num-
ber of deals steadily dropped from 1,944 to 1,590.269
Yet to become successful, top venture firms like Andreessen
Horowitz distinguish themselves by offering services and distinction to
startups in their investment portfolios.270  For venture firms to generate
an appropriate return on their investment, time, and ancillary services
spent on portfolio companies, they need to make relatively large invest-
ments in relatively mature companies.
3. Angel Technology Heightens the Gap
Angels are individuals who invest their own money directly in
early-stage startups.  Who are these angels and how do they make invest-
ments?  Not everyone can be an angel.  Legally, an angel must have at
least $1 million in net wealth or $200,000 in annual income,271 which is
approximately 3% of the U.S. population.272  Practically, an angel should
have a solid understanding of business planning, corporate finance, pre-
ferred stock investment and market conditions, plus a risk-seeking con-
267 Data aggregated from NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 35, at 38 figs.3.10
& 3.11.
268 Primack, supra note 37. R
269 Id.
270 See Menn, supra note 31. R
271 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2013).
272 Schlesinger, supra note 63. R
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stitution.273  Approximately 300,000 Americans made an angel
investment in the past two years.274
Angels invest in groups called “syndicates.”  A syndicate makes an
angel investment more efficient because only one angel needs to source,
review, or negotiate a seedfunding investment opportunity.275  Syndi-
cates can be quite large.  One of the largest established syndicates, Ohio
TechAngel Funds, has over 300 angels.276  But only 100 angels can in-
vest in a single company,277 so many syndicates, such as Seattle’s Alli-
ance of Angels, Southern California’s Pasadena Angels, and New York
Angels each have 100 members.278
Recently, angel online investing became hugely popular thanks to
websites such as AngelList, which was founded in January 2010 as an
online funding portal where companies can solicit investment from over
2,500 registered angels.279  There are two kinds of angels on AngelList:
“leads” and “followers.”  A lead on AngelList performs many of the
sourcing, diligence, and negotiations tasks.  If the lead does not take a
management fee—thus allowing other angels to free ride on those ef-
forts—it is called an “angel syndicated deal.”  An AngelList deal where
the lead receives a management fee is called an “angel advertised deal.”
Some venture fund managers are also leads for angels.  For exam-
ple, Marc Andreessen, general partner of Andreessen Horowitz, has
21,512 followers on AngelList.280  Celebrity investors also enjoy special
status.  Actor-turned-investor, Ashton Kutcher, has 23,060 followers.281
Even if you are not a “qualified purchaser” that can invest in a venture
fund, on AngelList you can invest with Marc and Ashton.
273 See generally WILTBANK & BOEKER, supra note 47 (asserting that due diligence, expe- R
rience, and participation are the three largest factors impacting the outcome of angel
investments).
274 See FAQs About Angel Groups, supra note 58. R
275 Jeremy Shure, AngelList Syndicates: Why Pooling Resources Is Good for Early Stage
Investing, INC. (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-shure/angellist-why-pooling-re-
sources-is-good-for-early-stage-investing.html.
276 See OTAF Has Invested $29M in 50+ Companies, REV1 VENTURES, https://www
.rev1ventures.com/investments/techangel-fund/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
277 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2012).
278 Jason Fell, The Top 10 Angel Investor Groups, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug.  14, 2011), http:/
/www.entrepreneur.com/article/220149.
279 AngelList is only one of several online funding portals for the purpose of startup
investment.  FundersClub, established in 2011, was the first online venture capital firm de-
voted to facilitating more inclusive startup investment. See Nate C. Hindman, Naval Ravikant,
AngelList: A Social Network that Connects Startups with Investors, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/naval-ravikant-angellist-startups-inves-
tors_n_966167.html; Laura Baverman, FundersClub Fills Void for Start-Up Investors, USA
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/17/
baverman-funders-club-online-venture-fund/6291007/.
280 Marc Andreessen, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/pmarca (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
281 Ashton Kutcher, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/aplusk (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
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As you can imagine, popular AngelList leads’ rounds get oversub-
scribed, but not in the way you would expect.  Securities laws limit an
angel group size to 100 investors, even if that is not enough to suffi-
ciently fund the company.282  Brad Feld, another very popular lead an-
gel,283 blogs about his experience with this problem.284  Due to this quirk
in the law, sometimes angel money gets left on the table.285
When an angel group decides to syndicate an investment into a star-
tup, the group first reaches out to its members to see who is interested in
funding the company.  In a relatively small group of twenty five inves-
tors, for example, everyone can always participate.  The issue for such a
small group is whether they can collectively raise enough money to meet
the startup’s capital requirement.  Each investor in a small group may
have to come up with more than he or she wants to invest in order to
close the round.
Angels need to diversify that investment.  Studies show that angels
who invest in ten or fewer startups generally lose money.286  Since 52%
of startups fail287 to earn a market rate of return (about 2.5x),288 angels
would be wise to invest in about 50 startups.289  In other words, investing
in a small number of startups is like playing roulette in Vegas by betting
on a single number again and again.  Statistically, such a strategy will
eventually result in losing all money.  Instead, angels prefer to invest in a
portfolio of companies.
Websites such as AngelList have made it cheaper for angels to in-
vest in more companies, and data show that angels do in fact invest less
per startup, even though total angel investment has increased.
282 See Fell, supra note 278. R
283 Mr. Feld has 28,159 followers on AngelList at the time this Article is being written.
Brad Feld, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/bfeld (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). He is also the Manag-
ing Director of the venture firm Foundry Group.
284 Brad Feld, The 99 Investor Problem, FELD THOUGHTS (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.feld
.com/archives/2014/01/99-investor-problem.html.
285 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2012).  A syndicate is a limited liability company created for the
sole purpose of making a particular investment.  As such, a syndicate will have to register as
an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “ICA”), unless it is
exempt.  There is a straightforward exemption.  Companies that have 100 or fewer members,
all of whom are accredited investors, are expressly defined as not investment companies pursu-
ant to 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).  This effectively limits angel syndicates to 100 members.
286 How Does Diversification Apply to Startup Investing, FUNDERSCLUB, https://funders
club.com/learn/investment-strategies/diversification/how-diversification-apply-to-startup-in
vesting/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
287 WILTBANK & BOEKER, supra note 47, at 3. R
288 Robert Wiltbank, Angel Investors Do Make Money, Data Shows 2.5x Returns Overall,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 13, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/13/angel-investors-make-2-5x-
returns-overall/.
289 Id.
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Figure 8: In sharp contrast to average early-stage VC investments, which have recently
increased to over $7M per investment, average angel seed-stage investments have fallen
to just over $300,000 per investment, even though total angel investment has generally
increased over the same period.290
B. Existing Exemptions Do Not Fill the Gap
As discussed in Part II, crowdfunding is heavily criticized in schol-
arly literature.  This Article also presents new criticisms about
crowdfunding.  But a flawed system can still be the best system.  As
Winston Churchill famously said, “Democracy is the worst form of gov-
ernment, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time
to time.”291  Is crowdfunding the worst way to seedfund a company, ex-
cept for all the other alternatives?  Unfortunately for crowdfunding, it is
not the best alternative for a startup to raise seedfunding of less than
$1 million.  This section discusses how crowdfunding, as it is currently
regulated, is an inferior substitute for existing options.
Regulators should keep in mind the crowdfunding alternatives be-
cause (among other reasons) if crowdfunding is designed as an inferior
alternative to direct competitors, only inferior companies will choose
crowdfunding for equity fundraising.  Alternatively, if crowdfunding is
redesigned to fill an underexploited niche in the startup ecosystem,
which is what this Article proposes as bridgefunding, crowdfunding will
improve the system as a whole.  This Article will next proceed with a
discussion of the non-crowdfunding ways in which a private company
may raise capital through the sale of equities.
290 Data aggregated from CVR Analysis Reports, supra note 38.
291 Ronald Hilton, Democracy and Churchill, WORLD ASS’N OF INT’L STUDIES (Sept. 5,
2003), http://wais.stanford.edu/Democracy/democracy_DemocracyAndChurchill%28090503%
29.html.
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Equity fundraising involves the sale of unregistered securities, so it
must be done under an exemption from the Securities Act.292  Regulation
D contains three rules (Rules 504, 505, and 506) providing exemption
from registration.293  Regulation A also allows private companies to raise
capital by selling stock without registering with the SEC.294  In addition,
the SEC plans to promulgate an expanded Regulation A, known widely
as “Regulation A+.”295
Of these exemptions, Rule 504, Regulation A, and Regulation A+
are the most similar to crowdfunding, as all three of these exemptions
allow companies to sell securities directly to non-accredited investors.296
Rule 504 is different from (and less useful than) crowdfunding, however,
because general solicitation is not permitted in a Rule 504 offering.297
Regulation A is different from (and more expensive than) crowdfunding
because an issuer making a Regulation A offering must comply both
with federal securities laws and state blue sky laws.298  Regulation A+
does not yet exist, but commentators suggest that it will be very similar
to crowdfunding, and some are even calling it “crowdfunding plus.”299
Crowdfunding is inferior to its alternatives in terms of cost.300  Raising
$1,000,000 via crowdfunding will cost between $76,660 and
$151,660.301  In contrast, raising a similar amount of money via Regula-
tion D costs about $25,000.302  Additionally, stock sold under Regulation
D has fewer limitations.303  This section will now explain these alterna-
tive equity fundraising exemptions in detail.
292 Regulation D Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
regd.htm (last visited Jan 13, 2015) (stating that pursuant to the Securities Act, all offers to sell
securities must be registered with the SEC unless they are exempt).
293 Id.
294 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2013).
295 Samuel S. Guzik, Regulation A+ Offerings—A New Era at the SEC, HARV. LAW SCH.
FORUM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/15/regulation-a-offerings-a-
new-era-at-the-sec/.
296 Id.
297 Rule 504 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www
.sec.gov/answers/rule504.htm.
298 Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A and the Jobs Act: A Failure to Resuscitate, 7
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 317, 322–23 (2012) (“The increase in the relative offering costs gener-
ated by the obligations to comply with state registration provisions simply price Regulation A
out of the marketplace for exemptions . . . .”).
299 James Johnson & David Pricco, Deep Dive: Investment Crowdfunding with “Regula-
tion A+,” CROWDEXPERT.COM, http://crowdexpert.com/investment-crowdfunding/regulation-
a-crowdfunding/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
300 Id.
301 Neiss, supra note 22. R
302 The model preferred stock financing investment agreement provides that the company
will reimburse investors’ counsel a flat fee of $10,000.  Generally, company counsel fees are
150% of investor counsel fees, for a total fee of $25,000.  Filing fees are de minimis. See
Series Seed—Term Sheet, supra note 199. R
303 Johnson & Pricco, supra note 299. R
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1. Regulation D
Regulation D includes three exemptions: Rules 504, 505, and
506.304  Common to all three of these exemptions is that companies issu-
ing restricted stock pursuant to Regulation D must file a “Form D” elec-
tronically online after selling the securities.305  Complying with
Regulation D has preclusive effect over state blue sky laws.306  In other
words, an issuer who complies with Regulation D may not have to com-
ply with state securities laws.307
2. Rule 504
Crowdfunding is not entirely new.  In fact, it is similar in many
ways to the current Rule 504 under Regulation D of the Securities Act.
Rule 504 offerings are similar to crowdfunding offerings because both
are limited to a sale of up to $1 million in securities in any twelve-month
period.308  Prior to 1992, Rule 504 offerings could be done through gen-
eral solicitation, but the SEC determined that this created too many op-
portunities for fraud.309
To put it another way, Rule 504 allows startups to sell up to $1 mil-
lion of securities in one of three ways: (1) through a general solicitation
to non-accredited investors with a disclosure document, (2) through a
general solicitation to accredited investors without a disclosure docu-
ment, or (3) without a general solicitation to non-accredited investors
without a disclosure document.310  Even if a startup issues securities
304 Regulation D Offerings, supra note 292. R
305 Id.
306 Jean L. Batman, Raising Money Through Private Placements, AM. B. ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/april_2012/raising_money_private_
placements.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (“Blue-sky compliance (meaning the securities
law compliance in each state where the securities are offered or sold) for Rule 506 offerings
was simplified by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Sec-
tion 18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act of 1933, which preempts a state’s registration require-
ments with respect to securities being offered and sold under Rule 506 of Regulation D. States
are permitted only to (i) require a notice filing from the issuer, (ii) impose a filing fee, and (iii)
require the issuer to consent to service of process in the state. In accordance with NSMIA,
each state generally requires an issuer that offers and sells securities in its state pursuant to
Rule 506 to submit the following materials within fifteen days after the first sale of securities
in that state in order to qualify for an exemption from registration: (a) an executed copy of
Form D Notice of Sale of Securities, (b) an executed copy of Form U-2 Uniform Consent to
Service of Process, and (c) a filing fee. A Form D must also be filed with the SEC.”).
307 Id.
308 Id.; see also Regulation D Offerings, supra note 292. R
309 C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case
for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 16 (2001).
310 The current Rule 504 only exempts securities that are not offered to the public and the
general solicitation unless one of the following circumstances are met: (1) the company regis-
ters the offering exclusively in one or more states that require a publicly filed registration
statement and delivery of a substantive disclosure document to investors; (2) the company
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under Rule 504 without a disclosure document, however, the company is
still subject to fraud rules.311  An omission of material information may
be considered a false or misleading statement.312  Therefore, startups is-
suing securities under Rule 504 are generally advised to provide a disclo-
sure document even if they do not have a general solicitation or if they
are only selling to accredited investors.313  Because of this onerous re-
quirement, there is limited added value in using Rule 504 as opposed to
Rule 506, which offers unregulated offerings.
Crowdfunding protects investors more than Rule 504 in several
ways.  First, Rule 504 issuers are subject only to general antifraud liabil-
ity under the Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.314  Crowdfunding issuers, how-
ever, are subject to 10b-5 liability in addition to liability under Securities
Act §§ 12(b) and 13.315  Rule 504 issuers are not required to make any
specific disclosure (although they are liable for fraud for material omis-
sions), whereas crowdfunding issuers must file a “Form C” with the
SEC.316
Perhaps the most significant way in which crowdfunding offers
greater protection for investors than Rule 504 is that crowdfunding issu-
ers must sell through a broker-dealer intermediary,317 whereas Rule 504
issuers can sell directly to the non-accredited investing public.318  The
crowdfunding intermediary is called a “funding portal,” which is essen-
tially a website connecting investors to investment opportunities.319  Un-
like the non-equity crowdfunding portals that exist today (e.g.,
Kickstarter, Indiegogo), which mainly offer listing services but not ac-
registers and sells the offering in a state that requires registration and disclosure delivery and
also sells in a state without those requirements, so long as the company delivers the disclosure
documents required by the state where the company registered the offering to all purchasers
(including those in the state that has no such requirements); or (3) the company sells exclu-
sively according to state law exemptions that permit general solicitation and advertising, so
long as the company sells only to “accredited investors.”  17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(i)–(iii)
(2014).
311 Rule 504 of Regulation D, supra note 297. R
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014); see also Anthony J. Zeoli & Georgia P. Quinn, Sum-
mary of Enacted Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemptions, CROWDCHECK (Mar. 19, 2014), http://
www.crowdcheck.com/content/summary-enacted-intrastate-crowdfunding-exemptions.
315 Section 12(b) requires that all securities traded on public exchanges be registered with
the SEC, and that the issuers of those securities disclose detailed information about the com-
pany and securities it issues.  Section 13 essentially functions as a supplement to 12(b), requir-
ing companies to file quarterly and annual reports in addition to various other documents upon
the happening of certain events.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78m (2012).
316 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
317 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C).
318 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
319 Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals
Under the Crowdfund Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 190 (2013) (explaining what a “por-
tal” is under the Crowdfund Act).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP203.txt unknown Seq: 52 20-APR-16 11:54
448 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:397
creditation, diligence, and disclosure services,320 crowdfunding portals
that can broker the sale of securities will be required to perform diligence
and ongoing review of listed issuers.321  Some commentators have recog-
nized that this mandatory requirement will increase the cost and legal
risk for crowdfunding portals so much that such portals will need to de-
vise a new business model.322
On the other hand, there is one important way in which crowdfund-
ing is more liberal than Rule 504.  Crowdfunding issuers may generally
solicit investment from non-accredited investors.323  In 1992, the SEC
took special notice of how pump-and-dump operations defrauded non-
accredited investors by general solicitation of bogus securities.324
Professor Thomas Lee Hazen has raised several concerns regarding
startups deceiving crowdfunding investors.325  Professor Hazen reminds
us, “as the Internet became more popular and widely used, online securi-
ties offerings took off and many less scrupulous promoters used the Rule
504 exemption for bogus or fraudulent offerings.”326  Many scholars are
therefore concerned that crowdfunding may give rise to a new wave of
fraudsters, despite the protections it offers.327
3. Rule 505
Rule 505 of Regulation D allows an issuer to sell up to $5 million of
securities in a twelve-month period to an unlimited number of accredited
investors and up to thirty-five other persons.328  Stock sold in this man-
ner cannot be resold for at least six months unless the stock is registered
with the SEC.329  Rule 505 is distinguishable from Regulation A—which
also allows for the sale of up to $5 million in securities—because Regu-
320 See Tom Cannon, A Challenge to the Concept of Crowdfunding, KICKSTARTER (Nov.
14, 2013), https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1066541019/thriftyvac/posts/662863.
321 See Ryan Calbeck, Why We Are Picky: The Importance of Curation in Crowdfunding,
FORBES (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2012/11/20/why-we-are-
picky-the-importance-of-curation-in-crowdfunding/.
322 Heminway, supra note 319, at 199. R
323 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
324 See Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 18,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm; see also Luis A. Aguilar, The
Importance of Small Business Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370543532516#.VKGSZEB-
ums.
325 Hazen, supra note 148, at 1737. R
326 Id. at 1763.
327 Id. at 1767–68.
328 Rule 505 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www
.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm.
329 Id.
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lation A allows general solicitation, whereas Rule 505 does not.330  This
advertising advantage for Regulation A is outweighed by the fact that
Rule 505 and the other Regulation D offerings have preclusive effect
over state blue sky laws, whereas Regulation A offerings are subject to
both federal and state securities laws.
4. Rule 506
Rule 506 of Regulation D is the only “unlimited” exemption from
the Securities Act, meaning that only under Rule 506 can issuers raise an
unlimited amount of money from issuing unregistered securities.331  Rule
506, therefore, is a popular exemption.  Rule 506 may also become more
popular now that the SEC has amended the rule to allow for general
solicitations to accredited investors.332  Similar to Rule 505, under Rule
506 issuers may sell securities to an unlimited number of accredited in-
vestors and thirty-five other purchasers.333  Unlike Rule 505, however,
under Rule 506 non-accredited investors must be “sophisticated.”334
Until recently, issuers hoping to take advantage of Rule 506 were
generally not allowed to solicit or advertise in order to market their se-
curities.  Rule 506 was recently amended to include Rule 506(c), which
allows general solicitation if: (1) the investors in the offering are all ac-
credited investors, and (2) the company has taken reasonable steps to
verify that its investors are accredited investors.335
Most startup investments are made pursuant to Rule 506 not only
because it allows for unlimited fundraising, but also because issuing
companies engaged in Rule 506 offerings are not required to use an inter-
mediary such as a registered broker-dealer.336  Crowdfunding, on the
other hand, will require issuers to sell stock through a broker-dealer or a
330 Id.; see also David Rodman, Regulation A+, the Jobs Act, and Public Offering Lite, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 100–01 (2013), http://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-onlinear-
ticle/2013/4/27/regulation-a-the-jobs-act-and-public-offering-lite.html.
331 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).
332 Gary Simon et al., SEC Amends Rule 506 to Permit General Solicitation in Securities
Offerings, HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP, http://www.hugheshubbard.com/PublicationDocu
ments/eAlert%20%20SEC%20Amends%20Rule%20506%20to%20Permit%20General%20So
licitation%20in%20Securities%20Offerings.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
333 Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/answers/rule506.htm.
334 Id. (“[T]hey must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters to make them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.”).
335 Id.
336 See generally Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions About
the Exemption from Broker-Dealer Registration in Title II of the JOBS Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/exemption-broker-dealer-re-
gistration-jobs-act-faq.htm.
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funding portal.337  Rule 506 is also superior to Rule 504 or 505 in that
only Rule 506 permits general solicitation of securities.338
5. Regulation A
Crowdfunding and Rule 504 of Regulation D are not the only ways
to sell stock to non-accredited investors.  The Securities Act also con-
tains an unpopular and infrequently used exemption called Regulation
A.339  Regulation A permits the sale of up to $5 million in startup equity
to non-accredited investors.340  Nonetheless, Regulation A is rarely used
because it requires issuers to circulate a complex disclosure document
called an “offering circular,” and it does not preempt state securities
laws.341  Therefore, issuers may be subject to a wide range of additional
regulation depending on where the investors live.342
Regulation A issuers must file a Form 1-A with the SEC, to which
they must attach the offering circular and financial statements that are
compliant with generally accepted accounting principles.343  This is not
only expensive, but it also subjects the issuers to liability if the informa-
tion on the circular is determined post hoc to be deficient or inaccu-
rate.344  Moreover, the public filing of such a statement makes it
impossible for the startup to remain in “stealth mode,”345 so such disclo-
sures can be detrimental to both the startup and its investors.  Once the
stock is sold, however, the company does not have to continue making
disclosures, thus making it difficult for secondary purchasers to value
337 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C) (2012).
338 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www
.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/general-solicitation-small-entity-compliance-guide.htm.
339 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251, .263 (2014).
340 Rodman, supra note 330, at 100. R
341 Guzik, supra note 295. R
342 Rodman, supra note 330, at 99 (“Reg A’s unpopularity stems from a number of fac- R
tors. These include the low ceiling on the amount that can be raised, the applicability of state
blue sky laws, and the costs of the required disclosure, including the obligation to file an
offering circular.”).
343 Id. at 100.
344 Id. at 103; see also Small Company Capital Formation Act of 2011; Regulation A
Revival?, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/110330-Small-Company-Capital-Formation-Act-2011.pdf (“Taking a small business
public is an important, but expensive process that requires millions in underwriting costs.”)
(citation omitted).
345 See Matt Villano, Why Startups Launch in ‘Stealth Mode’ and Others Don’t, ENTRE-
PRENEUR (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/229461 (explaining that startup
“stealth mode” is the practice of running a company in secrecy, or at least in relative anonym-
ity, and that while this may be done for a variety of reasons, stealth mode is most commonly
used to protect ideas or other types of intellectual property from the public and potential
competitors).
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stock issued under Regulation A and therefore limiting the liquidity of
those shares.346
Due to the problems with Regulation A and the superiority of its
alternatives, Regulation A is rarely used.  There were only 19 Regulation
A offerings filed in 2011,347 compared to 15,500 Regulation D
offerings.348
6. Regulation A+
The JOBS Act not only created crowdfunding, but also expanded
Regulation A to include a new type of securities issuance under what has
become known as “Regulation A+.”349  The change is most likely to in-
crease the use of Regulation A+ vis-a`-vis Regulation A in that an issuer
can raise $50 million350 instead of just $5 million.  More mature startups
may thus consider using Regulation A+ as an alternative to Regulation
D, where the costs of the Regulation A+ disclosures are outweighed by
the benefits of obtaining investment from non-accredited investors.
Regulation A+, however, similar to Regulation A, is not designed to
help startups begin their first round of funding.  Regulation A+ still re-
quires onerous and expensive disclosures that make it cost-ineffective to
raise a small round.351  Regulation A has proved to be too costly for
startups trying to raise up to $5 million.352  While Regulation A+ may
gain use by startups who want to raise between $5 and $50 million, it is
unlikely to provide a meaningful vehicle for Series Seed investment of
less than $5 million.353
In summary, the current crowdfunding regulation most closely re-
sembles the failed Regulation A.  That regulation failed to be a viable
exemption for startups to raise capital because it was too expensive and
too limited.354  Likewise, crowdfunding is exponentially more expensive
than its alternatives, and it can only be used to raise $1 million.355
Bridgefunding is similar to Regulation A+, which recognizes the failures
of expensive regulation by increasing the amount that can be raised.
Regulation A+ provides a potentially viable alternative to an initial pub-
346 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: FAC-
TORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 5, 7 (2012).
347 Id. at 9.
348 Id. at 10–11.
349 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012).
350 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(a).
351 Guzik, supra note 295. R
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id.
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lic offering.  Similarly, bridgefunding may provide a potentially viable
alternative for private equity financing.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced “bridgefunding,” a new way to think
about crowdfunding.  Crowdfunding is not only a way for the general
public to have the opportunity to invest in startups.  It can also provide
an opportunity for startups to access a new source of capital where they
need it most.  Bridgefunding views crowds as a potential third type of
investor in the startup financing market.  Crowds have special features
that make them better at certain types of investments.  This Article has
shown that crowds can occupy a valuable niche in the startup financing
market by investing $1 to $5 million in startup companies, helping them
safely navigate the Series A gap.  Promulgating regulations that allow
and encourage crowds to invest in the “bridgefunding zone”—between
the initial sub-million-dollar “seed stage” and the “Series A” stage of the
startup financing cycle—would be extremely beneficial to startups.
Crowds have proven on numerous occasions that they are willing to in-
vest millions of dollars in compelling products, products that may very
well fail to secure sufficient funding despite their successful premise and
often promising starts.  Crowds could provide the proverbial “shot in the
arm” necessary to make those companies successful.  Additionally, in-
vesting after angels—who may still provide the initial round of startup
financing—lets crowds take advantage of professional investor diligence,
oversight, and influence.  Following up initial angel investment also as-
suages fears that crowds may be subject to rampant investment fraud, as
investing a little bit later in the startup financing cycle makes investment
significantly safer for unsophisticated crowds.  This bridgefunding pro-
posal not only articulates the above solutions for the currently backwards
antifraud measures of the JOBS Act, but also illuminates how securities
regulation can be made more efficient by accounting for market
dynamics.
